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Selling Mayberry: Communities and
Individuals in Law and Economics
Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman

In an unusual turn of events, American Electric Power Company recently acquired the entire small town of Cheshire, Ohio. The buyout was
intended to put an end to a seriouspollution problem caused by the company's giantpower plant, which was located at the edge of town. Although
the plant was worth substantially more than the town, no simple Coasean
bargain guided the buyout. This Article combines ethnographic research
into the Cheshire buyout with theoretical insightsfrom law and economics
to present an empirical and theoretic challenge to the standardaccount of
nuisance disputes. It explores the transaction in detail and explains what
prevented the collective action and holdout problems usually thought to
hinder bargainingwith groups. Specifically, this Article shows how incorporating the role of community into conventional theory offers a new understanding of the likelihood of holdouts, the importance of community
dynamics, and the interdependency inherent in community-wide nuisance
actions. Finally, this Article briefly explores the implications of this new
understandingfor tort law, collective action, and the law of takings.
INTRODUCTION

"We used to be like Mayberry."'
2
"A little village is a big family-Cheshire."
"[T]here is no such thing as society. There are individual men and
women, and there are families." 3
The problem of industrial pollution has been a major impetus for the
ascent of law and economics theory.4 Beginning with Pigou,5 law and
1. Telephone Interview with Jennifer Harrison, Town Clerk, Cheshire, Ohio (June 25, 2002)
[hereinafter Harrison I] (describing what the community was like before the buyout proposal). For
those not familiar with the history of American television, Mayberry, North Carolina, was the bucolic
fictional town featured on The Andy Griffith Show from 1960 to 1968. A spin-off, Mayberry, R.F.D.,
ran until 1971.

2. These words appeared on an embroidered sampler we observed in the home of Cheshire
residents Jim and Eva Rife on February 10, 2003.
3. Interview by WOMEN'S OWN with Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister, United Kingdom (Oct.
31, 1987), reprinted in THE COLLECTED SPEECHES OF MARGARET THATCHER 576 n.l (Robin Harris

ed., 1997).
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economics scholars have taken turns at tackling this issue, producing a voluminous body of theoretic literature.6 In large part, however, scholars have
developed the theory through highly stylized examples or the analysis of a
few classic legal cases,7 with relatively little attention paid to the complex
behavioral responses that pollution cases engender in the real world.8 Although the economic analysis of pollution has been enormously influential,
in terms of both theory and policy,9 the analysis has been conducted entirely from a perspective of methodological individualism. That is, law and
economics scholars see victims in pollution disputes as acting independently of each other, with no interdependencies and no sense of social embeddedness. Although we acknowledge that the Thatcherite assumption of
atomistic individualism can be powerful and productive in many cases, we
argue that it is a highly incomplete description of human behavior, one that
can be misleading in some important settings.
One such setting is the subject of this Article-the unprecedented
buyout of the entire town of Cheshire, Ohio, by American Electric Power
Company (AEP), whose large, coal-fired power plant, located at the edge
of the town, was a significant source of the pollution affecting Cheshire
residents. The Cheshire buyout presents a challenge to standard economic
4. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and
Economics?, Ill YALE L.J. 357, 367-83 (2001) (discussing the centrality of pollution and nuisance
disputes in the law and economics literature). For a broader environmental perspective on the problem
of pollution, see WILLIAM F. BAXTER, PEOPLE OR PENGUINS:

THE CASE FOR OPTIMAL POLLUTION

(1974).
5.
ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 172-203 (4th ed. 1978) (proposing
internalization of externalities by taxation).
6.
We review the main contributions in Part 11,infra.
7. Two real-world cases that substantially influenced law and economics scholarship were
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970), in which the New York Court of Appeals
denied pollution victims injunctive relief and instead awarded them damages, and Spur Industries,Inc.
v. Del E. Webb Development Co., 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972), in which the Arizona Supreme Court
enjoined a feedlot from continuing its operation but ordered that a developer representing residents
indemnify the tortfeasor for the cost of moving or shutting down.
8. Robert C. Ellickson's ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991),
although not about pollution, is one exception. Another is Daniel Farber's extended study of the events
in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co. in PROPERTY LAW AND LEGAL EDUCATION 7 (Peter Hay & Michael

H. Hoeflich eds., 1988). William A. Fischel also has written about communities from a combined
ethnographic-law and economics perspective. An example is his treatment of Scranton, Pennsylvania,
in analyzing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon in chapter 1 of REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS (1995). His recent work on the importance of local public schools as
creators of social capital represents another significant effort to combine economic and legal analysis of
communities. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, AN ECONOMIC CASE AGAINST VOUCHERS: WHY LOCAL
PUBLIC SCHOOLS ARE A LOCAL PUBLIC GOOD (Dartmouth Coll., Working Paper No. 02-01, 2002)
(arguing that local schools foster the development of social capital by facilitating interactions among
parents).
9. Market-based environmental policies such as tradable emissions permits have significantly
influenced policy and generated important efficiencies in pollution cleanup. See, e.g., Robert N.
Stavins, Market-Based EnvironmentalPolicies, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

(Paul R. Portney & Robert N. Stavins eds., 2000).
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analysis, which predicts a bargaining failure in settings involving multiple
victims because of holdout problems.' ° Yet in Cheshire the polluter successfully transacted with ninety property owners without encountering any
real holdouts.
In attempting to understand what happened in Cheshire, we spent
nearly a year following the buyout as it unfolded. We visited the town,
conducted interviews with residents and local journalists who covered the
case, and tracked the story in the media. Our goals were to understand what
accounted for the unusual outcome in Cheshire, to evaluate the merits of
the buyout deal, and to explore the implications of this case for economic
theory and legal policy.
This Article argues that the standard law and economics account,
which ignores the importance of community, leads to errors in both the
positive and normative analyses of what happened in Cheshire. In line with
Robert Ellickson's investigation of Shasta County, California, this Article
posits that what seems on first glance to be a neat Coasean solution to an
externalities problem turns out, on closer examination, to look nothing like
what conventional theory predicts." This Article is about what happens to
the law and economics of pollution control when one allows for the possibility that victims may have an interest in a common asset"community"-that also is harmed by the polluter's actions. However, the
lessons of this Article are not merely negative: it also demonstrates how
the existence of communities can be incorporated into a law and economics
framework, with important implications for tort, collective bargaining, and
property theory.
Since publication of Ronald Coase's classic article The Problem of
Social Cost,'2 economists have identified high transaction costs as the key
10. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1119 (1972).
11.
ELLICKSON, supra note 8. We wrote this Article in the spirit of Ellickson's pioneering
ethnographic approach to law and economics. As with his epic study, our goal is to explore the
complex story of how a single community coped with a legal dispute and to demonstrate the theoretical
significance of what happened on the ground.
Understanding the Cheshire buyout also may hold immediate practical importance, because there
have been several reports of polluters attempting to induce similar buyouts elsewhere. See, e.g., Marego
Athans, Elderly Residents, Town to Share Their Last Days, BALT. SUN, Nov. 11, 2002, at Al (quoting
residents of West Virginia, across the river from Cheshire, who are attempting to generate a buyout by
AEP for their properties); Jim Belshaw, Don't Fight lt, Buy It, ALBUQUERQUE J., Aug. 14, 2002, at BI
(suggesting that Intel should buy the town of Corrales, New Mexico, to solve pollution problems from
its plant there); Rita Price, Residents of Village Near Power Plant FearRepeat of Cheshire, COLUMBUS
Disp., June 16, 2002, at B 10 (describing the town of Moscow, Ohio, located near a coal-fired electric
plant using the same selective catalytic reduction (SCR) technology as AEP's General James M. Gavin
Plant in Cheshire, and suggesting that some residents favored a buyout); Dale F. Sorget, Sempra Plan
Spells Lossfor Homeowners, SOUTH BEND TRIB., Aug. 8, 2002, at A I I (proposing that Sempra Energy
buy homes near its plant in Lake Township, Michigan, that lost value because of the plant's
construction and operation).
Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
12.
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barrier to the efficient internalization of externalities such as pollution. The
plant whose pollution was at issue in Cheshire comprises two of the
world's largest coal-fired electric generators; it seems likely that the plant
is worth much more to AEP than the town was to its occupants. The efficient solution to the problem of the plant's pollution is therefore not to shut
down the plant but to "move" the town, and that is precisely what has happened.
According to Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, however, in
cases involving multiple parties, such as public nuisance cases, efficiency
calls for liability rule protection: damages.' 3 In such instances, property
rule protection, injunctive relief, would invariably create holdout or collective action problems that would thwart the efficient allocation of resources. 4 Ensuring efficiency is the standard law and economics
justification for the landmark case of Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 5 in
which the New York Court of Appeals changed the nature of the residents'
protection from injunction to damages.
A similar logic should have applied to Cheshire. For the plant to continue polluting, it had to buy out all the residents. Suppose each of the
roughly ninety houses was worth $150,000 to its owner (for a total of $13.5
million), and that the cost of abating the pollution was $100 million to
AEP. There is thus a potential "surplus" from buying out the town of
$100 - $13.5 = $86.5 million. However, if eighty-nine home owners have
already agreed to sell at $150,000, the last owner can hold out for a much
higher price-say, $50 million-knowing that it will always be rational for
AEP to pay this amount rather than forego whatever surplus it would get if
it could close the deal. Because each home owner should reason in this
way, the standard law and economics analysis suggests that what happened
in Cheshire would never take place.
Although the standard account recognizes the possibility of multiple
victims of pollution, it assumes nothing is at stake in a pollution dispute
except the harms to individual property values or health. To the contrary,
this Article is about what happens to the law and economics account of
13.

See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 10, at 1125-27; see also, e.g.,

RICHARD

A.

POSNER,

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 56-57, 70 (5th ed. 1998) (discussing the conventional wisdom favoring

property rules where transaction costs are low and liability rules where transaction costs are high).
14.
See POSNER, supra note 13, at 69 (pointing out that "[tihe costs of transacting are highest
when elements of bilateral monopoly coincide with a large number of parties to the transaction" and
listing the case of "homeowners [who] have a right to be free from pollution" as the paradigmatic
example).
Ellickson and Been report, however, that there appear to be many more land assemblages than
theory would predict or than most scholars seem to believe. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L.
BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS, 1029-40 (2d ed. 2000). For an alternative mechanism for overcoming
holdouts, see Michael A. Heller & Rick M. Hills, The Art of Land Assembly (unpublished manuscript,
on file with authors).
15.
257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970). For a discussion of the theoretic significance of the case, see
Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, PliabilityRules, 101 MIcH. L. REV. 1,38-39 (2002).
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pollution control when we allow for the possibility that victims may have
an interest in a common asset-community-that is also harmed by the
polluter's actions.
That communities are valuable to people should come as no surprise.' 6
It is a key finding of a vast ethnographic literature and resonates well with
common experience.' 7 Moreover, community is a special kind of asset, one
whose value depends on the contributions of every individual who makes
up the group. If one individual exits-for instance, because of the community's pollution problem-she diminishes the value of the community for
all who remain. Hence, community is a kind of positive externality that can
exercise a profound effect on the outcomes of economic transactions (including pollution disputes).
The circumstances surrounding the Cheshire buyout strongly support
the idea that village residents valued the sense of community they found in
Cheshire. The analysis that follows documents the significant ties many
Cheshire residents-some with ancestral connections going back two hundred years-felt with their village. This Article suggests several explanations for what made the community so valuable to its residents and then
Of course, it has long been recognized that certain kinds of local public goods require many
16.
agents for their production. For example, collective action may be necessary to maintain irrigation
facilities, to conduct political activity to overturn Jim Crow laws, or to establish a town commons (and
then to prevent overgrazing of cattle on the common property). Communities are thus useful for
controlling the inefficiencies of collective action problems, which would otherwise lead atomistic
individuals to free ride on the efforts of others or to overexploit commonly owned resources. See, e.g.,
ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE
ACTION (1990).
Communities are also valuable as a source of norms that ensure trustworthy behavior when legal
sanctions are ineffective or unavailable, thereby allowing economically valuable transactions to take
place. See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: Civic TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY

(1993); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the
DiamondIndustry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 116 (1992); Janet Tai Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically
Homogeneous Middleman Group: An InstitutionalAlternative to ContractLaw, in TRUST, ETHNICITY,
AND IDENTITY 101 (Janet Landa ed., 1994).
The downside is that communities may also enforce "bad" norms such as racial segregation. See,
e.g., HORTENSE POWDERMAKER, AFTER FREEDOM 23-55 (1939) (discussing cultural enforcement of Jim
Crow norms); Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status
Productionand Race Discrimination,108 HARV. L. REV. 1003, 1044-63 (1995) (same).
17.
For a tiny sample, see ALAN EHRENHALT, THE LOST CITY: DISCOVERING THE FORGOTTEN
VIRTUES OF COMMUNITY IN THE CHICAGO OF THE 1950s (1995) (reconstructing the texture of life in
Chicago neighborhoods); KAI T. ERIKSON, EVERYTHING IN ITS PATH (1978) (stressing the loss of
community in Buffalo Creek, West Virginia, which was destroyed by flood); ROBERT D. PUTNAM,
BOWLING ALONE:

THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000) (documenting

statistically a decline in civic engagement); Isabel Wilkerson, 350 Feet Above Flood Ruins, a River
Town Plots Rebirth, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1993, at Al (recounting the story of Valmeyer, Illinois,
which was bought out by the government because it was in the floodplain of the Mississippi River but
that reconstituted itself on higher ground). Similar events occurred in Chelsea, Iowa, where "[p]eople
were split over whether to move away from this low spot beside the Iowa River or to stay put" in the
aftermath of serious flooding in 1993. See Monica Davey, Iowa Town Survived Flood but Teetered in
the Aftermath, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2003, at AI (describing a breakdown in community when some
residents left after the flood).
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argues that the significance of community explains important aspects of the
Cheshire story that otherwise would be puzzling. In particular, it argues
that the overlooked presence of "community extemalities"-strong interdependence among the utility functions of residents of the village-can
account for why essentially everyone in the village decided to sell, despite
the conventional wisdom that bargaining with groups invariably leads to
holdouts and other high transaction costs. Community ties also explain
how the town was able to overcome the collective action problem that theory predicts should undermine attempts to organize any concerted political
or legal struggle. Finally, community ties suggest that efficiency-minded
policy makers should be wary of approving community buyouts. Even
though the Cheshire deal was nominally voluntary, the buyout likely undercompensated at least some residents.
The Cheshire case holds five other implications for legal scholarship
and policy that extend far beyond our case study. The first concerns the
importance of law and legal doctrines in shaping bargaining. Law and economics scholars conventionally assume that settlement negotiations occur
"in the shadow of the law," meaning that parties bargain to roughly the
same result that would occur if the dispute were pursued to a final adjudication. 8 In Cheshire, concerns about health risks, delays, the disappearance
of community, and publicity were important motivating factors in residents' decisions. But little evidence exists that anyone decided to sell based
on whether it was possible to get an injunction or merely sue for damages.
In short, as Ellickson found in his study of Shasta County, California,19
formal law seemed to matter much less in Cheshire than did a number of
other, more pressing forces.
A second implication is that when a community is not viable at a
smaller scale than that at which it is currently operating, an offer to buy out
some residents may cause the community to unravel, thus forcing all remaining home owners to sell. The process is analogous to coercive tender
offers and to models of tipping and resegregation in the residential housing
markets, as we explain below.2"
Cheshire suggests a third insight which concerns the choice of remedies in nuisance disputes. Standard analysis of nuisance law treats the
choice of remedy as beyond the control of the parties in the dispute.2" The
decision whether to grant an injunction or damages lies exclusively with
the court; the polluter and victims, through their actions, have no control
over it. An important insight that emerges from this Article is that this
18.
Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Komhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979). Settlement agreements should thus track legal entitlements, with the
advantage that neither side has to bear the costs of litigation.
19.
See ELLICKSON, supra note 8.
20. See infra Part IV.D.3.
21.
See infra Part V.
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characterization may be inaccurate, at least as it relates to polluters.
Polluters may preempt the possibility of an injunction by making an abovemarket buyout offer to the residents. If the majority of residents accept this
offer, the polluter is in an excellent position to argue, if sued, that damages
are fully compensatory, and thus no injunction should issue.22
This finding opens the door to the possibility of private takings. 23 For
example, a polluter could offer to buy 60% of the affected properties for an
above-market price. 24 If the remaining 40% of the town is not viable on its
own, all residents will have an incentive to sell; indeed, they will compete
for the right to sell to the polluter. Because the polluter eliminates the possibility of an injunction by buying 60% of the town, the remaining residents face the cost of a lawsuit with the prospect of obtaining
compensation only for the value of their homes. 5 Preempting an injunction
by eliminating the potential of the residents to hold out guarantees a sale on
terms advantageous to the polluter.
A fourth insight from the story of Cheshire is that residents may refuse to sell and yet not be holdouts in the typical sense. A classical holdout
is a party who refuses to deal in a strategic attempt to extract rents. Two of
the older residents of Cheshire did choose not to sell; as we will show,
however, they do not fit the standard definition of a holdout. First, they
continued to refuse to sell even after it was no longer possible to obtain an
injunction. Second, both residents owned valuable riverfront land, and both
had strong sentimental attachment to their properties. These residents arguably should not be labeled holdouts because they simply placed higher
subjective value on their properties than AEP was willing or obligated to
pay. Thus, this Article proposes that such people might better be termed
"holdins."
A fifth insight from Cheshire is that analysis of community externalities suggests a revision in the law of takings. Currently, takings doctrine
applies the same compensation rule to all exercises of eminent domain. The
22. See Developments in the Law-.Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REV. 994, 997-1021 (1965).
Douglas Laycock suggests that this maxim is more honored in the breach than in the observance; the
easier it is for plaintiffs to secure an injunction, however, the more perplexing it is that no one sought to
do so in Cheshire. See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE (1991).
23. It has been suggested that allowing a nuisance causer to pay damages rather than face an
injunction permits an "inverse condemnation[, which] may not be invoked by a private person or
corporation for private gain or advantage. Inverse condemnation should only be permitted when the
public is primarily served in the taking or impairment of property." Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257
N.E.2d 870, 876 (N.Y. 1970) (Jasen, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). For an excellent
discussion of private takings, see Abraham Bell, Private Takings (unpublished S.J.D. dissertation,
Harvard Law School) (on file with authors).
24. The polluter might also make an offer to buy 100% of the affected properties. Offering to buy
a lower percentage induces competition among the sellers and increases the coercive element of tender
offers. Of course, the polluter may announce that he is going to buy only 60%, and then, if a larger
percentage of residents agrees to sell, buy from them all.
25. See infra Part V.
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existing rule entitles owners of property taken by the government to
receive fair market value; owners of adjoining properties are not eligible
for compensation. Furthermore, the number of properties the government
takes is irrelevant to the calculation. The uniform treatment of all takings
may lead to gross undercompensation when community externalities exist.
As an objective compensation measure, fair market value does not capture
the value that property owners derive from living in a close-knit community. Worse yet, the existing rule offers no compensation for loss of community amenities to members whose property is not physically taken. 6
Thus, when community externalities are strong, the current compensation
regime not only is unfair but also may be inefficient. Because takers are not
forced to internalize the full economic effect of their actions on communities, both the government and private corporations may transfer property
interests from unconsenting individual owners to themselves, even when
doing so creates a net welfare loss. To take account of community externalities, we devise a new typology of takings by dividing the universe of takings cases into three conceptual categories: isolated takings, tippings (in
which the government condemns multiple properties in a community and
thereby undermines its ability to continue to exist), and clearings (in which
an entire community is uprooted).27 We then propose a differential compensation regime tailored to compensate communities for the full range of
harms inflicted by exercises of eminent domain.
This Article consists of seven parts. Part I lays out the basic facts in
the Cheshire case and explains the challenge it presents for standard economic analysis. Part II summarizes the law and economics literature on
pollution. Part III analyzes in detail the legal rules that govern the allocation of responsibility for the pollution in Cheshire and assesses the likely
remedies residents could have obtained if they had decided to pursue legal
action against the polluter. A basic assumption of law and economics theory is that any alternative to litigation (such as the kind of settlement that
occurred in Cheshire) will take place in the shadow of the legal rules allocating liability and defining remedies, so parties' perceptions of their legal
rights will inevitably shape the outcome. Part IV documents the importance
of community externalities in Cheshire and explains why a strong community is less likely than a weak community to generate strategic holdouts.
The last three parts explore the importance of these findings for tort, collective action, and property theory. Part V argues that polluters can affect a
court's choice of remedy in nuisance cases by making above-market buyout offers. If, as claimed, polluters can forestall the use of injunctive relief
26. See generally Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Takings Reassessed, 87 VA. L. REV.
277 (2001) (exploring the effects of eminent domain on neighboring property owners).
For a classic discussion of clearings, see Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (addressing
27.
the condemnation of land for redevelopment under the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act).
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by making attractive buyout offers, this opens the door to the possibility of
private takings, situations in which polluters can in effect force property
owners to sell to them. Part VI explores a mechanism for resolving collective action problems in group negotiations. Part VII concludes the Article
by incorporating the insights from Cheshire into a novel framework for
assessing takings compensation.
I
THE STORY OF CHESHIRE

The town of Cheshire was founded in 1834.28 Located in southern
Ohio, on the banks of the Ohio River near West Virginia, it was a small
village, with about 220 inhabitants (roughly ninety families) spread over
sixteen acres, with one pizza parlor, one stoplight, and one gas station. Its
nearest neighboring town was roughly seven miles away.
At the edge of town is a coal-fired electricity-generating plant, the
General James M. Gavin Plant, owned by AEP.

The Gavin Plant29
28. See Stephen Buckley, Lights Out in Cheshire,ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 10, 2002, at IA.
29. The visible discharge coming from the stacks is largely water vapor. Photograph available at
http://www.dispatch.com/news/news02/un02/cheshiregallery/pages/8cheshire35Ox245.htm.
Copyright
© 2003 The Columbus Dispatch. Reprinted with permission of the publisher.
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The plant is one of the largest of its kind in the world, and AEP is one of
the biggest firms in the United States, with revenues of $60 billion in 2001.
The plant's massive scale of operations is difficult to describe in words;
only after visiting the place were we able to appreciate its "brooding
omnipresence. 30 Surprisingly, given the small size of the town and the
large size of the plant, only one resident of Cheshire worked at the Gavin
Plant as of 2002.
A.

The Gavin Plant'sPollution

The Gavin Plant has long been a significant source of emissions. According to records of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
"[b]efore recent efforts to curb pollution, Gavin was the nation's largest
source of sulfur dioxide, the main ingredient in acid rain . .

. .""

The Gavin

Plant also held the dubious distinction of leading the nation in "emissions
of nitrogen oxide, which creates smog, and was one of the leading sources
of carbon dioxide."3 2 This record prompted AEP to take action that significantly reduced total emissions.3 3 The plant's efforts notwithstanding,
"[d]uring 2001, Gavin ranked seventh in the nation among power plants for
total emissions of carbon dioxide and 18th for nitrogen dioxide .... ""
Unfortunately, the very actions that have led to a drop in the level of
total emissions have concentrated the remaining pollution on the plant's
nearby surroundings. Jennifer Harrison, the town clerk and a Cheshire resident, stated that before 1995, the main problems were occasional fallout,
which ate through paint on vehicles, and excessive noise of up to 140 decibels from exhaust fans, which AEP eventually mitigated by installing mufflers.35 She said she had an insurance claim for paint damage every year,
and dirt was always a problem. "In 1995," however, "things got worse.
That's when AEP. .. lowered the [height of the] stacks from 1,100 to 800
feet."36 Even then, only one resident sued, and his claim was settled.3"

30. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (demystifying the
common law).
31.
Michael Hawthorne, Cheshire: Death of a Village, COLUMBUS Disp., Nov. 10, 2002, at Al.
32. Id.
33. Id. For example, "[tihe plant released about 5 pounds of sulfur dioxide for every megawatt
hour of electricity it generated [in 2001], down sharply from the 56 pounds per megawatt hour it
released in 1990." Id.
34. Id.
35.
Interview with Jennifer Harrison, Town Clerk, Cheshire, Ohio (Feb. 10, 2003) [hereinafter
Harrison II].
36.
Harrison I, supra note 1. Before the blue plume problem, which arose at a later time, there
"'wasn't anything that was a problem to us,' said Charles Reynolds, 57, who owns the bait shop."
Stephanie Simon, To Holdouts, Offer to Buy Town Is Dust in Wind, L.A. TiMES, Aug. 25, 2002, at Al.
In the summer of 2001, however, "locals did notice a problem, touched off ironically when the utility
installed new pollution control equipment." Id.
37. Harrison I, supra note 1.
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To be fair to AEP, it is imperative to note that regulatory intervention
apparently forestalled an alternative method of reducing emissions of sulfur dioxide. Around 1989, in response to tougher pollution standards,
AEP ... planned to switch to low-sulfur, out-of-state coal at Gavin,

which it said would be less expensive. Faced with political pressure
from the state's mining interests, the Public Utilities Commission
gave AEP a choice: Absorb the cost of switching fuel sources, or
charge ratepayers to install scrubbers designed to reduce sulfur
pollution from Ohio coal.38

If AEP had been able to use low-sulfur coal, the blue plume problem that
was to later arise would likely have been much less severe.39 Denied this
alternative, however, AEP resorted to a different, technological solution.
In 2001, the plant installed a new selective catalytic reduction (SCR)
scrubber system designed to ensure that emissions of nitrogen oxide would
comply with the EPA's 2003 requirements for coal-fired power plants.4 °
After it was installed, however, it became clear that although it reduced
nitrogen oxide emissions, the SCR actually increased emissions of sulfur
trioxides.4 The increased sulfur trioxide emissions were apparently caused
by a complex interaction between the new scrubber and another antipollution mechanism at the plant that was supposed to remove sulfur from the
gases formed when coal was burned.42
38. See Hawthorne, supra note 31. If regulators had treated the cost of installing scrubbers as a
capital expenditure, AEP would have been allowed to increase its "installed base" by the cost of the
scrubbers, and therefore could have passed this cost on to its consumers in the form of higher prices to
cover this expense. Because regulators threatened not to treat the scrubbers as a capital expenditure,
however, AEP would have had to pay for them out of shareholder profits as an operating expense,
which obviously made installation of scrubbers a very unattractive proposition. That environmental
regulators might prefer a more costly method of achieving a clean environment is not a new conclusion.
For a pioneering analysis of the political economy of air quality regulation, see BRUCE A. ACKERMAN
& WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR (1981) (arguing that the EPA enforced the Clean Air
Act in such a way as to protect the eastern coal industry and its dirtier coal at the expense of western
coal producers).
39. According to Jennifer Harrison, AEP experimented with low-sulfur coal in the summer of
2002, with favorable results. See Harrison II, supra note 35.
40. According to AEP's Web site, the technology had been used safely worldwide since the mid1980s and was the only postcombustion technology that would achieve the EPA's emission standards.
The SCR works by mixing ammonia into the plant's exhaust gases. In the presence of a catalyst, the
SCR is able to remove more than 90% of the nitrogen oxide. See Press Release, American Electric
Power, AEP to Buy Property near Gavin Plant; Will Use Space for Enhancements (Apr. 16, 2002),
available at http://www.aep.com/newsroom/newsreleases/default.asp?dbcommand=DisplayRelease&
ID=896&Section=Corporate&colorControl=on.
41.
See Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, ToxFAQs for Sulfur Trioxide and
Sulfuric Acid (June 1999), at http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/tfacts 17.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2003) ("SO 3
[sulfur trioxide] forms sulfuric acid when it comes in contact with water. Sulfuric acid can cause bums
to the skin, eyes, lungs, and digestive tract.... EPA limits the amount of sulfur dioxide that can be
released into the air. This limits the amount of sulfur trioxide and sulfuric acid that form from sulfur
dioxide in the air.").
42. The new SCRs were originally designed to be run using 360,000 gallons of anhydrous
ammonia, which was to be stored in liquid form in large tanks at the plant. Residents were told that if a
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Even though the plant has an 830-foot smoke stack, under certain
weather conditions the sulfur trioxides formed a bluish plume that settled
over the town. During the summer of 2001, this plume caused a variety of
symptoms in many Cheshire residents. Some "people [developed] sores on
their lips and tongues, nausea, vomiting and headaches. 43 Others complained of "burning eyes, blistered lips, nagging coughs and bum marks on
their cars." On some muggy days, "they would spot a blue haze hovering
over the village, like exhaust from an alien spacecraft.""
AEP claimed that "at no time during the plant's operation did
emissions in the plume exceed any health-based ambient air quality
standards or permissible exposure limits established by federal or state
regulations."4 5 An AEP spokesman, Pat Hemlepp, denied "'[t]here has
been [any] ... long term health impact, just a short term impact. Any
attempt to sue on health grounds would have [sic] a slam dunk for us
because all of the monitoring has shown it is not an issue. '"'46 And yet, a
monitor installed by the EPA in Cheshire's town hall had to be recalibrated
because on particularly bad days, sulfur dioxide levels exceeded the machine's measurement capability.47
Setting aside the issue of whether emissions actually exceeded the
regulatory limits,48 the company did attempt to devise a technical solution
tank began to leak, "they would have 6 minutes to evacuate or everyone would die." Harrison II, supra
note 35. In the end, pursuant to lobbying from residents, the plant decided to use a safer, urea-based
technology. Id.
43.
Harrison I, supranote 1. Newspaper reports from other residents confirmed these details.
For decades, folks [in Cheshire] have looked out at the smokestacks from their vegetable
gardens and their backyard swings, from the schoolyard, from the playground. The vapors
smearing the sky have been as much a part of the local landscape as the Ohio River. And few
have given it much thought.
Simon, supra note 36, at Al.
44. Simon, supra note 36, at Al.
45. Press Release, American Electric Power, AEP Will Invest $7 Million to Address Community
Concerns over Plume Appearance at Gavin Plant (Jan. 31, 2002), available at http://www.aep.com/
newsroom/newsreleases/default.asp?dbcommand DisplayRelease&ID=887&Section=Environmental&
colorControl=on (attributing this point to John F. Norris Jr., AEP's senior vice president of operations
and technical services). As to the air quality standards at issue, the EPA has stated that
The primary NAAQS [National Ambient Air Quality Standards] for sulfur oxides, measured
as SO 2 [sulfur dioxides], are 0.14 parts per million (ppm), or 365 micrograms per cubic meter
(ptg/m 3), averaged over a period of 24 hours and not to be exceeded more than once per year,
and an annual standard of 0.030 ppm, or 80 jtg/m3 never to be exceeded. The secondary
standard for SO 2 is 0.50 ppm, or 1300 jig/m 3 averaged over a three-hour period. The
secondary standard may not be exceeded more than once per year.
EPA Approval and Promulgation of Air Quality Implementation Plans; Pennsylvania; Revision to the
State Implementation Plan (SIP) Addressing Sulfur Dioxide in Philadelphia County, 67 Fed. Reg.
57,156 (Sept. 9, 2002) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52).
46. David Teather, Smoke, Tears, Anger-Then Emptiness-in the Village Bought by a Power
Company, THE GUARDIAN, May 14, 2002, at 3.
47. Interview with Ron Hammond, Cheshire schoolteacher, in Cheshire, Ohio (Feb. 10, 2003);
Harrison II, supra note 35.
48. Harrison suggested that "[t]he standard is 5 particles [sic]/billion. At times, it has gone up to
300-700 particles [sic]/billion." Harrison I, supra note 1.
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to the problem. In a January 2002 press release, AEP suggested it had developed a technique (involving the injection of water, magnesium
hydroxide, and calcium hydroxide into the plant's emissions) that would
"produce the chemical changes required to reduce SO3 [sulfur trioxide]
levels."4 9 These modifications were supposed to cost about $7 million (for
only one of the two units at the Gavin Plant)." However, residents expressed some doubt about the technological efficacy of this solution.5
B.

A Buyout Emergesfrom the Smoke

In the meantime, many residents of Cheshire remained concerned
about the health risks to which they had already been exposed and worried
about future exposure. 2 Residents complained to the EPA, and in 2000 the
Agency accused the plant of violating the Clean Air Act, an accusation
AEP denied. 3 A subsequent investigation by the Agency for Toxic
Substances and Disease Registry found the plant's emissions did "pose a
public health hazard to some residents, particularly residents with asthma,"
but concluded that there were no documented long-term health effects. 4
The precise history of the buyout negotiations is somewhat murky. In
particular, it is difficult to identify the "Coasean moment" at which the deal
was conceived. Initially, the residents' focus was litigation; it was for this
purpose that they engaged a team of environmental lawyers.55 According to
one source, the buyout proposal emerged out of a series of emails from the
49. Press Release, American Electric Power, supra note 45.
50. [d. The plan was to install the modifications at only one of the units to determine their
efficacy and cost. AEP would equip the next unit only after reviewing the results from the first.
According to an EPA press release of May 2002, "AEP, which is now using high sulfur coal,
has ... agreed to stockpile low sulfur coal before it starts operating its SCR. If the injections fail to
control the sulfuric acid emissions, AEP will promptly switch to low sulfur coal or implement any other
equally effective short term measure." Press Release, Environmental Protection Agency, EPA, Ohio
EPA Reach Agreement with AEP Gavin Plant (May 8, 2002), available at http://www.epa.gov/
Region5/news/news02/02opa062.htm.
51.
Ron Hammond pointed out to us that this solution had been tried only in European plants
operating on a smaller scale and with a different scrubber technology. The Gavin Plant's significantly
"wetter" process, according to Hammond, made it a poor candidate for this solution. Hammond, supra
note 47.
52. Hammond expressed concern about future health effects in an interview aired on a radio
program.
Iget out the door and I look at the plume, you know, to see what's happening. I want my
daughters to get out and play in the summer. I check the sulfur dioxide monitor to see if it's
safe for them to play outside. And if it's not, you tell two little girls ages seven-and Emily
almost I0-"It's a beautiful day outside, but you can't go out and play."
Analysis: Ohio Power Plant Buying Out Homes in Cheshire (National Public Radio broadcast, June
24, 2002).
53. See Katharine Q. Seelye, Utility Buys Town It Choked, Lock, Stock and Blue Plume, N.Y.
TIMES, May 13, 2002, at Al ("At this point, the company is not even in violation of E.P.A. rules.").
54. Id.
55. Hammond, supra note 47. The team of lawyers was led by Richard Ayres, Barry Neuman,
and Kathy Bailey, all of whom declined numerous invitations to speak to us.

CALIFORNIA LA W RE VIE W

[Vol. 92:75

residents to AEP, and was as much an expression of frustration as a serious
offer.56 Residents apparently expressed shock when their lawyers came
back from meeting with AEP with a buyout proposal, although the buyout
had been rumored for some time.57
AEP ultimately agreed to pay roughly $15 million for the town, and
about $4.5 million to the residents' lawyers. According to the company, the
purpose of the deal was to enable expansion of the plant's facilities, including a new dock and coal storage space. 8 The company adamantly denied
any liability for pollution and framed the deal only as a way of securing the
needed space.59 Yet residents had to waive all future claims against AEP as
part of the buyout. The company's position is that the terms of the settle-

ment that barred residents from suing the company for damage to past or
future health were "just the lawyers doing their jobs" and played no role in
the negotiations.6"
The exact formula for computing compensation has not been disclosed, and residents and their attorneys will not discuss the specifics. The
following terms are publicly known:

(1) Payment was made based on 1999 tax assessments. Sellers received a minimum of $100,000 per property, with prices ranging
61
from two to three and a half times the 1999 assessed value. It appears that no properties in Cheshire had been sold during the two or

three years preceding the buyout, in large part because no one
wished to move into the town, given the uncertainty about the pollution and attendant health risks.62
(2) AEP did not insist that everyone sell. However, the deal
apparently contained a requirement that more than half of the
56. 1d.
57. Id.; Harrison II, supra note 35. It is noteworthy that all parties involved had a stake in
keeping the exact details of the negotiation process cloudy. Furthermore, all maintained that the initial
proposal came from the residents. We discuss the significance of this detail in Part VI, infra.
58. Press Release, American Electric Power, supranote 40.
59. According to one reporter, "[s]ince the closing of a nearby coal mine in Meigs County that
had supplied Gavin with six million tons each year, the coal-burning plant has increased its river traffic
by some 3,500 barges a year, company officials say. Meigs coal arrived by land; its replacement comes
by river." Rita Price, Watery Highway: The Ohio River Holds Tight the Hearts of Those Who Work,
Live Along Its Banks, COLUMBUS Disp., Sept. 1, 2002, at B 1.
The company may have had many reasons besides the obvious reason of reducing its pollution
liability to describe the buyout as a plan to allow expansion of the plant. A site-specific expansion
rationale limits the precedential value of the sale and reduces the likelihood that communities located
near other AEP plants could seek similar treatment. Moreover, the expansion rationale offered a reason
for the company's unwillingness to buy properties just outside the town limits, where the health risk
was presumably no less than that inside the town itself.
60. Teather, supra note 46.
61.
Mary Beth Lane, Cheshire Land Buyout: Village Holdouts May Derail Agreement,
COLUMBUS

Disp., Sept. 14, 2002, at Al.

62. Harrison I, supranote 1. Harrison noted that the housing market was "abysmal." Houses had
been on the market for two or three years and did not sell. In the past (before 1995) there was a normal
real estate market.
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residents tender their land before the purchase offer would become
binding on the buyer.63
(3) Residents who wished to remain in their homes could sell and
retain a life estate. This arrangement was apparently conditioned on
their not staying away from Cheshire for more than 119 days in any
year, which would result in forfeiture of the life estate.6 4
(4) Purchases were contingent on residents signing a waiver for
any past health damage caused by exposure to emissions from the
plant, either from the blue plume or previously.65
Ultimately, all but two resident and four nonresident property owners
agreed to sell. In addition, roughly ten to twelve elderly residents sold but
elected to remain in their homes for the duration of their lives. The two
resident owners who chose to stay were long-term Cheshirites who apparently placed very high subjective values on their land or houses.66 Most of
those who sold purchased new homes in the general area.67 However,
unlike some other towns that have been dissolved, the residents of
Cheshire did not agree to move en masse to a new location.68 Finally, despite the buyout, residents voted overwhelmingly not to dissolve the town
government, so technically Cheshire still exists and will be governed by its
roughly fifteen remaining residents.69
The Cheshire buyout presents several anomalies for conventional economic theorizing about torts involving multiple victims. First and foremost,
the Cheshire buyout was simply not supposed to happen. The deal involved
more than ninety sellers and a single buyer, a setting that according to theoretic predictions should have been rife with holdouts. Yet the deal went
forward relatively smoothly, without any apparent holdouts (in the

63.
Id.
64. Harrison II, supra note 35. Given that most residents who opted for this arrangement are
elderly and might need extended medical care, the requirement of continued presence could have farreaching effects on the life estate tenants.
65.
Todd J. Gillman, After Blue Clouds Enveloped Town, Power Plant Will Buy It for $20
Million, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 10, 2002.
66. We discuss these cases in Part VI, infra.
67. According to one reporter, "several families plan to remain within breathing distance of the
plant's emissions when they move out of Cheshire." Simon, supra note 36, at A l. Few residents moved
more than twenty miles away. Harrison II, supra note 35.
68. The case of Valmeyer, Illinois, which relocated on higher ground to avoid flooding from the
Mississippi, is one example. See Wilkerson, supra note 17.
69. Cheshire is funded by the State of Ohio on a five-year basis, and its revenues are guaranteed
for another four years. Hammond, supra note 47; Harrison II, supra note 35. Hence, the village can
continue to operate for at least that long, even with a diminished tax base. There are additional
administrative constraints, however: state law requires that the village have at least six elected
councilors and an elected mayor, four of whom must be present to conduct business. An appointed
financial officer may replace the town clerk. Harrison I1,supra note 35.
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economic sense of the term).7" Second, the sell-off raises important questions of economic efficiency. Commentators and courts usually presume
that voluntary transactions benefit all parties involved. Yet the case of
Cheshire suggests that at least some sellers tendered their property only
because they feared it would become worthless unless they sold immediately. In other words, although seemingly voluntary, at least some of the
sales likely involved a coercive element, which casts doubt on the efficiency of the deal. Finally, theory suggests that a free rider or collective
action problem should undermine residents' efforts to lobby for and negotiate a deal with AEP. These problems did not occur in Cheshire.
The remainder of this Article is dedicated to theoretic discussion of
these and other challenges raised by Cheshire's story. We commence with
a review of the economic analysis of pollution disputes, as it has evolved to
date.
II
THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF NUISANCE LAW

The problem of pollution has long preoccupied economic theorists
and policy makers. Because the benefits of the pollution-producing activity
go solely to the polluter, while the costs of pollution are distributed to its
victims or to society at large, pollution is a classic example of an externality or market failure. Hence, rational, self-interested polluters will underinvest in abatement efforts. At least at first glance, it appears that a laissezfaire world will therefore have an inefficiently high level of pollution; society will be forced to endure pollution that has harms in excess of its
7
abatement costs. '

A.C. Pigou was the first economist to address the challenge of misaligned incentives posed by pollution. His solution to the externality created by pollution was to make the polluter pay the full social cost of her
actions by imposing a tax on emissions.73 If the factory emitted one hundred tons of pollution, with a social harm of one dollar per ton, then a tax
of one dollar per ton would force the polluter to "internalize" the true social costs of its behavior. With the tax in place, a ten-dollar investment in a
70. We discuss the difference between the economic definition and the colloquial use of the term
in Part VI, infra. Of course, it is impossible to rule out the possibility that the resident owners who
remained will decide, at the end, to sell to AEP at a premium over the collective deal.
71.
A simple numeric example helps illustrate why this result obtains. Suppose the polluter could
install a scrubber that would completely eliminate all pollution. The cost of the scrubber is ten dollars,
while the cost of the pollution to its victims is one hundred dollars. Even though society as a whole
would realize a net gain of ninety dollars from installing the scrubber, the polluter would gain only a
negligible individual benefit from doing so and would need to incur the full ten-dollar cost.
Consequently, the polluter would not install the scrubber, even though it would be welfare enhancing to
do so: the pollution is therefore inefficient.
PiGou, supra note 5, at 172-220.
72.
73.
Id.
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scrubber now looks like a good deal to the polluter; instead of saving society one hundred dollars in pollution damages, the scrubber saves the polluter herself one hundred dollars in pollution tax liability, for a net savings
of ninety dollars.74 Essentially, Pigou understood pollution as a public
problem necessitating a regulatory solution.
Ronald Coase challenged Pigou's characterization of pollution in his
classic article The Problem of Social Cost.75 Coase made two important
contributions to the analysis of the pollution question. First, he realized that
nuisance law, with appropriate damages, could serve the same function as a
Pigouvian tax on pollution.76 Instead of the government implementing a tax
at the appropriate rate, the nuisance law solution requires that a court make
the polluter pay the full cost of his pollution as damages to the victimplaintiffs.77 In this way, the polluter once again is made to internalize the
full harm of the pollution and will thus clean up pollution as long as it is
cheaper to do so than to pay damages.78
Coase's second major insight reconceived pollution as a private bargaining problem rather than an issue for public regulation. Suppose that
pollution is cheap to clean up and costly to its victims but that for some
reason a court does not deem the pollution a nuisance. Even though the
polluter is under no legal obligation to cease polluting, Coase realized that
when bargaining is costless, the parties will have an incentive to strike a
deal under which the polluter eliminates the pollution in exchange for
payment from the victims.79 If a court finds the pollution to be a nuisance,
74. Although the tax "solves" the externality problem in a technical sense, it does so only by
finessing some difficult implementation issues. First, the government must be able to monitor the
amount of smoke the polluter emits so it can properly define the tax "base." A second, even more
difficult challenge has been the source of considerable academic skepticism. To send the correct signal
to the polluter, the government must be able to set the correct tax rate. Determining the correct tax rate
requires complete information about the social harms created by a ton of emissions. Victims of
pollution are heterogeneous in terms of their sensitivity to its effects. Some victims can presumably
mitigate the harms to themselves at relatively low cost-for instance, by installing air filters or painting
their houses more often. Others face more serious health consequences that are almost impossible to
mitigate except by moving beyond the pollution's reach. Hence, valuing the social harm of pollution is
extremely difficult. Moreover, the costs of pollution are likely to vary with the amount of emissions.
The effect of the first ton of pollution may be higher or lower than the effect of the hundredth ton, and
the appropriate pollution tax requires that we price each ton at its marginal cost. In short, Pigou's
solution, while technically appealing, places a severe informational burden on the regulatory
apparatus-a burden most economists have concluded is very difficult for regulators to carry.
75.
Coase, supra note 12.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78.
Id. Again, however, the informational requirements involved in this "solution" are not to be
slighted: courts must be able to determine the victim-plaintiff's damages correctly and consider all
victims' costs, even if not all decide to litigate against the offending polluter.
79. Id. The assumed inefficiency of the pollution guarantees that there is a price-less than the
victim's harm from the pollution and more than the costs of cleaning it up-at which a mutually
beneficial cleanup deal can be struck. In the above scenario, even if the polluter had the legal right to
continue polluting, the victim or victims could offer the polluter some amount between ten dollars (the
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the payment of damages (or the granting of an injunction) will also cause
the pollution to cease.8s
Although Coase dispensed with the difficult valuation problems inherent in the Pigouvian approach, he did so only by substituting an equally
intractable problem-that of transaction costs. Transaction costs are notoriously difficult to define, but one can think of them as anything that impedes private bargaining between two or more parties. They might include
the costs of determining those with whom one needs to negotiate,8' the
costs of reaching an agreement, 2 and the costs of enforcement, as well as
the costs imposed by strategic behavior as each side haggles for the most
favorable outcome. 83 As Coase was the first to admit, in a world of high
transaction costs, parties will not be able to bargain for an efficient level of
pollution because the costs of reaching a deal may exceed any gains from
the deal itself. In such a setting, some other kind of solution to the pollution problem must be found.
Coase's main insight was negative: in a world without transaction
costs, both regulation and legal liability would be redundant. He offered
little guidance on either the role or the design of legal rules when the cost
of transacting is positive. Calabresi and Melamed then extended the
Coasean insight by exploring the role of legal institutions in a world with
positive transaction costs. 4 They observed that the law performs two different functions: allocating entitlements to resources and determining how
such resources are to be protected.85 In addressing the question of protection, Calabresi and Melamed focused on the choice between injunctive relief and damages-labeling the former a "property rule" and the latter a
"liability rule."8 6 Drawing on Coase's work, Calabresi and Melamed proposed that injunctive relief should be favored when transaction costs are
low, and damages should be preferred when transaction costs are high.
scrubber cost) and one hundred dollars (the pollution cost) to install the scrubber. The elimination of
pollution for any payment in this range would leave both parties better off than before the deal.
80. Efficiency also obtains when the costs of cleanup are one hundred dollars and the benefits are
only ten dollars, so it is now efficient to continue polluting rather than clean up. Even if the victims are
granted an injunction that closes down the plant, the polluter will offer them something between ten
and one hundred dollars to allow the pollution to continue, and both parties will be better off.
A further advantage of private bargaining is that it eliminates the need for courts or regulators to
value either the harms to victims or the cost of cleaning up the pollution. Victims can arguably assess
for themselves how much they would be willing to pay to eliminate or reduce pollution, and the
polluter can assess how much it will cost to eliminate the emissions in question. Hence, both parties can
strike a deal on their own when it is in their interests to do so.
81.
See generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 20-22
(1985).
82.
Id.
83.
See Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, II J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 23 (1982) (observing that
strategic bargaining may thwart efficient allocation of resources).
84. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 10, at 1089-93.
85.
Id.
86. Id.
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Their rationale was that when the cost of transacting is sufficiently low, the
party subject to the injunction will buy the entitlement from its holder if
she values the entitlement more highly.8 7 When transaction costs are high,
on the other hand, optimal allocation through bargaining is not possible,
and courts should award damages to allow the liable party to choose between paying damages and ceasing the harmful behavior, whichever is less
expensive."
In the post-Coasean world, then, the crucial question for legal policy
becomes what determines the amount of transaction costs. Although there
is no definitive answer, the consensus view in law and economics is clear
on at least one issue: transaction costs should increase as the number of
parties in the negotiations increases. Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen's
textbook, for example, lists large numbers of parties as a factor promoting
high transaction costs.89 A. Mitchell Polinsky arrived at a similar conclusion in his article on the economics of nuisance law, suggesting that when
the number of victims is large, bargaining between polluter and victims is
essentially impossible.9" Elizabeth Hoffman and Matthew Spitzer make the
same claim: more parties increase the amount of transaction costs.9'
Large numbers generate high transaction costs for two reasons. First,
the presence of many parties makes coordination difficult. Consider a polluter who wishes to buy permission to pollute from all those affected by his
factory's smoke. The more victims there are, the harder it is to locate them
all and to screen out actual victims from those who are not affected. Once
the victims are identified, the process of negotiating deals with all of them,
or of creating a single representative for the victim class as a whole, remains. Also, more victims might increase the heterogeneity within the victim class, which may make negotiating agreements problematic.
A second obstacle to holding down transaction costs is the holdout
problem to which we alluded earlier. Holdouts have pride of place in economic theory. Transaction costs economics predicts that bargaining with a
large number of entitlement holders, each of whom could veto the entire
project, will invariably create a holdout problem. This problem arises because each seller is the marginal claimant for the entire deal and, as such,
has the power to extract the full bargaining surplus. Suppose that to
87. Such bargains guarantee efficiency, for reasons outlined earlier. See analysis of Coase, supra.
As long as victims' banns are greater than the polluter's cleanup costs (i.e., the pollution is
88.
inefficient), damages set at any amount greater than the cleanup costs guarantee efficiency. Such
damages make it cheaper for the polluter to clean up than to pollute and pay damages.
89.

See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 86 tbl.4.3 (2d ed. 1997).

90. Hence, neither private damages nor injunctions are effective remedies when there are
multiple victims. Instead, class action litigation (or perhaps public enforcement) should be preferred.
See A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and
Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075, 1109 (1980).
91.
Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Experimental Tests of the Coase Theorem with
Large BargainingGroups, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 149, 150 (1986).
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construct a new residential development, the builder needs to acquire ten
adjoining properties. The deal is worth $10 million to the builder, and each
resident values her property at $100,000. Given that the bargaining surplus
is $9 million, the project is welfare enhancing and therefore should be undertaken. However, each resident knows that if the nine others agreed to
sell for $100,000, she could extract up to $9.1 million-the builder's entire
surplus from the project. Reasoning backward, each resident would strive
to be the last person to sign on, leading to failure of the project. Anticipating this dynamic, buyers would normally abstain from negotiating with
groups, because such negotiations are likely to generate high transaction
costs with little hope of success.
Although it is commonly asserted that holdouts are more likely as the
number of parties increases, the rationale for this view is not entirely clear.
So, for example, Calabresi and Melamed suggest that where "we enjoin
Taney and there are 10,000 injured Marshalls," there will likely be holdouts whose presence would make it impossible for all the Marshalls to
agree to allow Taney to continue his nuisance, even though it would be
efficient to do so.92 Hoffman and Spitzer agree, suggesting that "[a]s a
theoretical matter, there is reason to believe that the parties will likely fail
to exhaust the gains from voluntary trade as the number of parties
increases, because the problem with holdouts becomes more acute." 93
We summarize the conventional wisdom about how to deal with nuisance problems in the first row of Table 1. With few parties, theory suggests that transaction costs should be low and hence that private bargaining
between the polluter and his victims is feasible. In these circumstances,
assigning the right to pollute (or to be free of pollution) to either side via a
property rule, thus avoiding the need for a court to calculate damages, will
produce an efficient result through a trade of entitlement for money. With
many parties, theory predicts that transaction costs will be high, so bargaining between the parties is unlikely to be feasible. Hence, courts should

92. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 10, at 1119.
93.
Hoffman & Spitzer, supra note 91, at 150. Their proof of this assertion assumes that the
population at large consists of a large number of individuals, of whom g% are greedy and I - g/o are
"reasonable." (Greedy persons always hold out, whereas reasonable ones always accept a "fair"
bargain.) See id It is then obvious that the probability that at least one greedy person will be found in a
random sample of size N increases as the sample size increases. Hence, holdouts are more frequent in
larger groups. Of course, Hoffman and Spitzer's "explanation" for this result boils down to nothing
more than an assumption about players' strategies, which are fixed ex ante. In essence, they simply
assumed the result they were trying to prove.
In fact, however, the holdout problem is really no different from the bilateral monopoly problem
that occurs when a single seller faces a single buyer. As Robert Cooter pointed out long ago, theory and
common sense both predict that parties will bluff, exaggerate, stall, hold out, and take other strategic
measures to achieve a greater share of the surplus available from a successful bargain. Such measures
are properly thought of as a kind of transaction cost, and there is no reason to think they are more likely
as the number of parties increases. See Cooter, supra note 83, at 23.
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allow polluters to either pay damages or eliminate the pollution, whichever
is cheaper.
TABLE

1

OPTIMAL LEGAL RULES AND NUMBER OF PARTIES

Few Parties
Theory

Property rule (injunction):

enhance private bargaining

Many Parties
Liability rule (damages):
private bargaining precluded

by high transaction costs
No bargaining after injunctions:
Practice enmity (Farnsworth94 ) or
No holdouts: Cheshire9 5
bilateral monopoly

II

Empirical studies fail to bear out the prediction that bargaining should
succeed when the number of parties is small, however.96 For example,
Ward Farnsworth investigated twenty nuisance suits to learn if the parties
bargained over the outcomes after a final disposition by the judge.9" He
selected the cases with an eye toward meeting the requirements for low
transaction costs-small number of parties, only a single issue, and so on.98
He reported results completely at odds with the outcome he had expected
based on theory: "[N]one of the parties in the twenty cases made trades
after judgment. They generally did not negotiate at all after judgment. Nor
did the lawyers in these cases think there would have been bargaining if the
litigation had ended with a judgment in the opposite direction."99
Thus, after Farnsworth's study, only one tenet of the theory of optimal
legal rules in nuisance disputes remained largely unshaken: the prediction
that liability rules should be employed in multiparty disputes. Indeed,
Farnsworth's results indirectly lent additional credence to this prediction.
For if parties do not bargain even when transaction costs are low, a fortiori,
there is no reason to expect successful bargaining when transaction costs
are high. The only study that seemed to point in the opposite direction was

94.

Ward Farnsworth, Do Partiesto Nuisance Cases BargainAfter Judgment? A Glimpse Inside

the Cathedral,66 U. CM. L. REV. 373 (1999).

95. The experimental evidence from Hoffman and Spitzer also suggests that holdouts are unlikely
to arise in negotiations with as many as nineteen sellers. Hoffman & Spitzer, supra note 91, at 150.
96. See, e.g., ELLICKSON, supra note 8; John J. Donohue Ill, Diverting the Coasean
River: Incentive Schemes to Reduce Unemployment Spells, 99 YALE L.J. 549 (1989).
97. Farnsworth, supranote 94.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 384 (footnote omitted). Farnsworth suggests that enmity or acrimony between the
litigants constituted the major barrier to postlitigation negotiations. Id. Additionally, he attributes the
lack of negotiations to parties' view that their claims were not translatable into cash. Id.
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a behavioral experiment conducted by Hoffman and Spitzer, who foundat least under laboratory conditions-that buyers were able to negotiate
deals with up to nineteen sellers without encountering serious holdout
problems.' 0 Yet no real-world study has ever substantiated their finding.
On the contrary, several authors have written on the prevalence of holdouts, suggesting that the holdout problem is both serious and real.'0 '
Our study of the Cheshire buyout is an attempt to bridge theory and
practice. The Cheshire buyout suggests that conventional law and economics models go astray by failing to appreciate the significant effects of
communities. In developing the theory of nuisance disputes, theorists have
begun with a single polluter and a single victim and then, holding everything else (but transaction costs) equal, increased the number of victims.'02
But this approach misses the essential jointness of decision making in environments characterized by strong interpersonal ties. We discuss the effect
of this factor on standard theorizing in Part IV, infra. First, however, we
must consider two alternatives that might explain the absence of holdouts
while remaining consistent with traditional law and economics analysis.
III
BACKGROUND LEGAL RULES AND THEIR APPLICATION TO CHESHIRE

Conventional law and economics theory offers two explanations for
why none of the Cheshire residents decided to hold out and sue AEP. First,
the residents may not have had a viable legal claim under Ohio nuisance
law. 0 3 Second, the expected value of holding out may have been less than
the value of AEP's buyout offer. Only if neither of these rationales explains the absence of holdouts is it necessary to look beyond the standard
law and economics analysis.

100.

Hoffman & Spitzer, supra note 91, at 150.

101.

See, e.g., ANDREW ALPERN & SEYMOUR DURST, HOLDOUTS! (1984); ANDREW ALPERN &

SEYMOUR DURST, NEW YORK'S ARCHITECTURAL HOLDOUTS (1984).
102. See, e.g., Polinsky, supra note 90.
103. Ohio law would have governed the residents' claims. Fortunately (for the purposes of this
Article), Ohio nuisance law is nearly identical to the model both law and economics scholars and law
professors use. For example, Ohio law recognizes causes of action for both private and public nuisance.
See infra text accompanying notes 107-12, 122-26. Moreover, it permits pollution victims to bring a
nuisance suit against regulated polluters. See infra text accompanying notes 114-15. Finally, and most
important, it provides for both damages and injunctive relief. See infra text accompanying notes 13034. Therefore, any outcome predicted under Ohio law is generalizable to law and economics theory and
to the many other states that elected not to follow New York in denying injunctive relief to pollution
victims. See Boomer v. AtI. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970); cf. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra
note 15 (discussing the effect of Boomer on the legal entitlement of the residents).
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Ohio Nuisance Law

Nuisance law constitutes an important intersection between property
and torts. Despite its long history, °4 or perhaps because of it, nuisance law
has evolved into a "legal grab-bag that the courts seize[] upon as a
substitute for analysis whenever they wish[] to redress an injury. ' This
judicial proclivity has made nuisance a top contender for the "mostimpenetrable-jungle-in-the-entire-law" award. 0 6
1.

Cause ofAction

Nuisance law encompasses two distinct causes of action, private and
public nuisance, which share very little other than their name.'0 7 Private
nuisance arises from the "invasion of another's interest in the private use

and enjoyment of land."'0 8 Public nuisance arises from an invasion of a
public right--for example, the obstruction of a public road." 9 Ohio law

104. For an excellent historic review, see Jeff L. Lewin, Boomer and the American Law of
Nuisance: Past, Present, and Future,54 ALB. L. REV. 189, 192-96 (1990) (tracing the origin of private
nuisance law back to the twelfth century).
105.
Id. at 192; accord W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

549-50 (5th ed. 1984) ("It has meant all things to all people, and has been applied indiscriminately to
everything from an alarming advertisement to a cockroach baked in a pie." (footnotes omitted));
William L. Prosser, Insurance Without Fault, 20 TEX. L. REV. 399, 410 (1942) (dubbing nuisance a

"legal garbage can").
106. KEETON ET AL., supra note 105, at 618 ("There is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the
entire law than that which surrounds the word 'nuisance."').

107.
Because AEP has been operating in Cheshire for about three decades, if sued, AEP could
raise a statute of limitations defense. With respect to public nuisance, the general rule in Ohio is that
"no length of time can legalize a public nuisance." Little Miami R.R. Co. v. Comm'rs of Greene
County, 31 Ohio St. 338, 349 (1877); accord 1540 Columbus Corp. v. Cuyahoga County, 589 N.E.2d
467, 470 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990). As for private nuisance, the statute of limitations in Ohio is four years.
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.09(D) (Anderson 2001).
Importantly, Ohio law divides private nuisance claims into two types, "permanent" and
"continuing." In Olpp v. Hocking Valley Railway Co., 31 Ohio Dec. 453 (Ct. C.P. 1920), the Court of
Common Pleas defined a permanent nuisance as one that continues indefinitely without change of
character, id. at 468, and a continuing nuisance as abatable by skill and labor, id. at 469. For permanent
nuisances, the statute of limitations begins to run "at the time that the nuisance begins or is first noticed,
provided that the permanent nature of the nuisance can be ascertained at that time." Brown v. County
Comm'rs of Scioto County, 622 N.E.2d 1153, 1162 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (citing Michael A.
DiSabatino, Annotation, When Statute of Limitations Begins to Run as to Cause ofAction for Nuisance
Based on Air Pollution, 19 A.L.R. 4th 456, 459-60, § 2(a) (1983); Louisville Brick & Tile Co. v.
Calmelat, 6 Ohio Ct. App. 435 (Ct. App. 1917)). For continuing nuisance, an action "can be brought for
damages for those injuries incurred within the [limitations period], regardless of when the nuisance
began." Brown, 622 N.E.2d at 1162. We believe that the air pollution produced by AEP should be
classified as a continuing nuisance. First, the character of the emissions changed in 2001 after the
installation of the SCRs, which caused the appearance of the blue plume. Second, there is ample
evidence that AEP could take measures to abate the nuisance. Hence, a statute of limitations defense
would not bar the residents' potential suits for either a public or a private nuisance.
108.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821 D (1979).
109.
See, e.g., Donald G. Gifford, Public Nuisance as a Mass Products Liability Tort, 71 U. CIN.
L. REV. 741, 833 (2003).
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provides causes of action for both private and public nuisance." 0 To prevail
in a private nuisance suit, "it is not necessary that [the residents] should be
driven from their dwellings .... [I]t is enough that [the residents']
enjoyment of life and property is rendered uncomfortable, for in some
circumstances discomfort and annoyance may constitute a nuisance."'' . Of
particular relevance to our case is Ohio's recognition of qualified nuisances
that consist of "anything lawfully but so negligently or carelessly done or
permitted as to create a potential and unreasonable risk of harm which, in
due course, results in injury to another." ' 2
Under Ohio's qualified private nuisance claim, AEP's activities would
still constitute a nuisance even if AEP was complying with all applicable
air pollution regulations." 3 An action for a qualified private nuisance "is
essentially an action in tort for the negligent maintenance of a condition,
which, of itself, creates an unreasonable risk of harm, ultimately resulting
in injury.""' 4 In Blankenship v. S.H. Bell Co., a case involving facts very
similar to those of Cheshire, the court found a polluter liable even though
"[it] was not formally found to have violated its permits.""' 5
The Cheshire residents thus had a strong prima facie case against AEP
for maintenance of a qualified nuisance." 6 A qualified private nuisance
claim first requires a demonstration of substantial injury resulting in physical discomfort. There is substantial evidence that AEP caused such an injury. In January 2002, the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease
Registry reported that the levels of sulfur dioxide and sulfuric acid in

110.
See Brown, 622 N.E.2d at 1158. In Rautsaw v. Clark, 488 N.E.2d 243 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985),
the Ohio Court of Appeals further elucidated that the law of private nuisance "generally turns on the
factual question[s] whether the use to which property is put is a reasonable use under the
circumstances, and whether there is 'an appreciable, substantial, tangible injury resulting in actual,
material, [and] physical discomfort."' Id. at 245 (citations omitted) (quoting Antonik v. Chamberlain,
78 N.E.2d 752 (Ohio Ct. App. 1947)).
111. See Brown, 622 N.E.2d at 1161 (citing 61 AM. JUR. 2D Pollution Control § 531 (1981)).
112.
Metzger v. Pa., Ohio, & Detroit R.R. Co., 66 N.E.2d 203, 205 (Ohio 1946) (quoting Taylor v.
Cincinnati, 55 N.E.2d 724, 732 (Ohio 1944)); see also Interstate Sash & Door Co. v. Cleveland, 74
N.E.2d 239, 239 (Ohio 1947) ("As distinguished from a qualified nuisance involving
negligence .... absolute liability attaches notwithstanding the absence of fault."); State ex rel. Schoener
v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 619 N.E.2d 2, 5 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) ("Strict liability is imposed when an
absolute nuisance is found to exist, but negligence must be proved to establish a qualified nuisance.").
113.
Brown, 622 N.E.2d at 1160.
114. Id. (citing Allen Freight Lines, Inc. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 595 N.E.2d 855, 856 (Ohio 1992)).
In Rothfuss v. Hamilton Masonic Temple, the Ohio Supreme Court held that "[i]n an action based on
the maintenance of a qualified nuisance, the standard of care owed to one injured is that care a prudent
man would exercise in preventing potentially or unreasonably dangerous conditions to exist." 297
N.E.2d 105, 109 (Ohio 1973).
115.
No. 94 CIV 422, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 6418, at *8 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 22, 1999).
116. Others have reached the same conclusion; the lawyers representing the residents also believed
that they had a strong case, at least with respect to certain individuals. Hammond, supra note 47.
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Cheshire "pose[d] a public health hazard to some residents, particularly
residents with asthma," and produced "adverse effects on the lungs." ' 17
Furthermore, the blue plume emanating from AEP's plant had immediate
adverse effects on the physical well-being of Cheshire residents, who experienced breathing problems, headaches, and eye soreness. 1 8 In certain
cases, the blue plume created sores and aggravated preexisting medical
conditions." 9 It also instilled fear of future injuries in many Cheshire residents.
Because the claim requires a demonstration of negligence along with
injury resulting in physical discomfort, Cheshire residents also would have
had to prove that the benefits to residents of pollution abatement outweighed the costs to AEP. Significantly, AEP admitted that it could abate
the emissions of sulfur trioxide.' Indeed, AEP repeatedly stated that it
would take measures to do so.' 2' Given the documented environmental impact, the health effects, and the existence of cost-effective abatement
measures, it appears that the residents had a fair chance of prevailing in a
private nuisance suit against AEP.
Cheshire residents' case in an action for a public nuisance seems
equally strong, perhaps even stronger.'22 Section 3745-15-07 of the Ohio
Administrative Code prohibits the
emission or escape into the open air.. . of smoke, ashes, dust, dirt,
grime, acids, fumes, gases, vapors, odors, or any other substances
or combinations of substances, in such manner or in such amounts
as to endanger the health, safety or welfare of the public, or cause
unreasonable injury or damage to property.'23

117. Seelye, supra note 53, at Al (quoting the Agency's report).
118. See, e.g., Harrison 1,supra note 1.
119. Hammond, supra note 47.
120. See Press Release, American Electric Power, supra note 40.
121.
Id.
122. The weight of authority suggests that an action for a public nuisance-like an action for a
private one-requires a showing of either an absolute nuisance or a qualified nuisance. Thus, our
analysis of qualified nuisance is equally applicable here. However, recently, in Hager v. Waste
Technologies Industries, No. 2002-Ohio-3466, 2002 WL 1483913 (Ohio Ct. App. June 27, 2002), the
Ohio Court of Appeals stated that
By enacting [Ohio Administrative Code § 3745-15-07], Ohio declared that the proscribed
conduct therein constituted an unreasonable interference with a public right ... to remain free
from exposure to polluting substances that in such a manner or amount endanger the health,
safety or welfare of the public, or which causes unreasonable injury to property .... [Such
conduct] is found to be a public nuisance.
Id. at* 11.
123.
OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-15-07 (2003). It is also noteworthy that section 3704.05(A) of the
Ohio Revised Code states that "[n]o person shall cause, permit, or allow emission of an air contaminant
in violation of any rule adopted by the director of environmental protection." OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3704.05(A) (Anderson 2002).
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To bring a private action for a public nuisance, an individual resident or the
Village of Cheshire as a whole would have to demonstrate a particular
harm "of a different kind than that suffered by the public in general.' ' 4 In
Brown v. County Commissioners of Scioto County, the Ohio Court of
Appeals specifically stated that where a party "lost an opportunity to sell
her property and was unable to use and enjoy it, [her harm is] sufficiently
distinct or particular. . . so as to allow recovery under a statutory nuisance
theory.' ' 5 Under this standard, the residents of Cheshire probably had
26
standing to bring a private action for a public nuisance against AEP.1
Furthermore, the residents could have involved the EPA in their legal
battle against the plant. The EPA was already closely following the problem, and pressure from the residents could have resulted in administrative
action against the plant. 27 Additionally, the residents could have tried to
persuade the attorney general to bring a lawsuit for a statutory public nuisance against AEP, 218 thereby substantially increasing the likelihood that
residents would receive injunctive relief.
2. Remedies
But what remedy could the Cheshire residents obtain if they prevailed? Specifically, could the residents secure an injunction against AEP?
In an action for either private or public nuisance, a plaintiff may seek damages or injunctive relief' 29 As a rule, the standard remedy in an action for a
124.
Brown v. County Comm'rs of Scioto County, 622 N.E.2d 1153, 1160 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
125. Id.
126. It should be noted that in Hager v. Waste Technology Industries, 2002-Ohio-3466, 2002 WL
1483913 (Ohio Ct. App. June 27, 2002), the Ohio Court of Appeals refused to overrule a summary
judgment denying relief to neighboring property owners who brought an action for statutory public
nuisance against a hazardous waste incineration facility. Critical to the court's decision was its finding
that the property owners "produced no evidence, other than mere allegations, that any of the alleged
pollutants or emissions endangered the health, safety, or welfare of the public." Id. at *14. Furthermore,
the defendant adduced two expert testimonies attesting that "the alleged airborne pollutants and odors
emanating from WTI [Waste Technologies Industries] were minimal or nonexistent." Id. at *16. In
Cheshire, by contrast, it is quite clear that the emissions posed a danger to the health of the residents.
127. After the purchase was negotiated, Ohio regulators levied a $40,000 fine against AEP "for
allowing burned-coal waste, called fly ash, repeatedly to escape from the Gavin plant. Separately last
month, federal regulators found the company violated the Clean Air Act by allowing high levels of tiny
particles to repeatedly blow from the plant." Mary Beth Lane, Cheshire: Some Who Are Staying Won 't
Vote to Dissolve, COLUMBUS Disp., Feb. 2, 2003, at DI.
128. The Ohio Revised Code provides that "[tihe attorney general, upon request of the [director of
environmental protection], shall bring an action for an injunction, a civil penalty, or any other
appropriate proceedings in any court of competent jurisdiction against any person violating or
threatening to violate section 3704.05 ... of the Revised Code." OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 3704.06(B)
(Anderson 2002).
The Cheshire residents we spoke to were highly skeptical about the political will of state regulators
to act against AEP. In their view, Cheshire was in a politically disenfranchised part of Ohio and AEP
was a major force in Ohio politics. They believed they had little or no chance of getting regulators to
intervene on their side in this dispute. Hammond, supranote 47; Harrison II, supra note 35.
129. See generally JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 755-59 (3d ed. 1993).
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private nuisance is monetary damages; a court would grant an injunction
only if damages could not adequately redress the injury. 3 ' If a claim for
damages is sustained, "the measure of damages is not the decrease in value
' 31
of the fee but the impaired value of the use of the premises."'
Courts award equitable relief only if the injury is irreparable. 32 Thus,
if a nuisance causes only property damage, injunctive relief is unlikely.
When a nuisance also affects health and comfort, however, the analysis
changes, and courts are more willing to enjoin the harmful activity. 3 3 Actual personal injury is not a prerequisite for an injunction. Substantial annoyance or physical discomfort that do not amount to an actual injury may
also warrant injunctive relief' 34 Furthermore, in the case of continuing nuisances, Ohio law generally allows plaintiffs to proceed in equity to relieve
them of the burden of having to bring a new suit for damages every several
35

years. 1

Given that courts have broad discretion in deciding whether to grant
injunctive relief, it is difficult to predict with accuracy how the residents
would have fared. However, unlike in Boomer, an injunction probably
would have required only that AEP abate the pollution rather than close the
plant. As explained below, AEP could have implemented at least three

130. See, e.g., Adams v. Gorrell, 161 N.E. 786, 787 (Ohio Ct. App. 1927) ("If one so uses his
property as to injure the rights of another, he is liable in damages to the person so wronged, and, if the
damages are not adequate, and the injuries cannot be fully compensated in money, a court of equity will
intervene by way of injunction and grant appropriate relief.").
131.
Frey v. Queen City Paper Co., 66 N.E.2d 252, 254 (Ohio Ct. App. 1946). One measure of the
"impaired value of the premises" is the depreciation in rental value or the cost of repairs. Id.
132.
Irreparable harm is an injury for which no plain, adequate, and complete remedy exists in
law. See Harden Chevrolet Co. v. Pickaway Grain Co., 194 N.E.2d 177 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1961); see also
Olpp v. Hocking Valley Ry. Co., 31 Ohio Dec. 453, 472 (Ct. C.P. 1920) ("By the term irreparable
injury it is not meant that there must not be any physical injury or possibility of repairing the injury. All
that is meant is that the injury would be a grievous one, at least a material one, and not adequately
reparable in damages.").
Douglas Laycock has argued that despite this kind of rhetoric, plaintiffs can often secure an
injunction without proving an "irreparable injury," because courts have watered down the meaning of
that phrase:
A wide range of wrongs relating to land are regularly held to inflict irreparable injury. These
include ... nuisance [and many other wrongs]. Courts offer a variety of explanations for why
the injury is irreparable in these cases[ ....but] [wihatever the rationale, injunctive relief is
almost never withheld in these cases on the ground that damages are an adequate remedy ....
[However,] it is sometimes withheld on other grounds, especially the disproportionate
expense of removing an encroachment or abating nuisance.
LAYCOCK, supra note 22, at 38 (footnotes omitted).
133. For example, in McClung v. North Bend Coal, 6 Ohio Cir. Dec. 243, 261 (Cir. Ct. 1895), the
court granted the plaintiff injunctive relief, finding that smoke and noxious gases emitted by the
defendant's coal operations had seriously and injuriously affected the plaintiffs health.
134. Dale v.Bryant, 141 N.E.2d 504, 507 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1947) (citing Eller v. Koehler, 67 N.E.
89 (Ohio 1903)).
135. See discussion supranote 107.
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measures, at varying costs, to abate the pollution. The mere existence of
these alternatives strengthens the case for injunctive relief. A court also
would likely have given weight to the fact that the town itself and many of
its residents were there before the plant was built, and long before the pollution problem started.'3 6
Despite the findings of Douglas Laycock's comprehensive studywhich showed that prevailing plaintiffs typically get the remedy they
seek'137 -- obtaining an injunction is not a foregone conclusion. In light of
the modem judicial proclivity against injunctions, one should not overestimate the likelihood of obtaining such relief.' However, even under a
strict standard, the residents would have had a nonnegligible chance of securing injunctive relief if they had chosen to litigate. Moreover, even a
credible threat to sue could have improved residents' bargaining position
because such a lawsuit likely would have adversely affected AEP's reputation, a situation the company probably would have been eager to avoid.
And yet, not a single resident chose to take AEP to court.
B.

Expected RationalBehavior Under TraditionalEconomic Analysis

The Cheshire buyout deal was susceptible to two kinds of holdouts.
First, each resident could refuse to deal and instead could bring an action
for a nuisance against AEP, seeking to enjoin the pollution. We refer to this
possibility as the "pollution holdout." Second, because AEP was planning
to expand its operation, the company needed to construct a new dock on at
least some of the properties held by Cheshire residents."' The affected
residents were therefore in a position to block the expansion plan by refusing to sell. We refer to this strategy as the "expansion holdout."
1. The Pollution Holdout
For any resident in a pollution dispute, the issue is not whether she
can hold out but rather which action produces the greatest payoff in monetary and nonmonetary terms. Because the issuance of an injunction is a
probabilistic event, and the payoff is also uncertain, it can be difficult for

136. On the principle of "first in time" in property, see DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 129, at
3, 14-15, 24.
137. See LAYCOCK, supra note 22, at vii ("Plaintiffs usually get the remedies they seek, because
courts usually find that other remedies are inadequate.").
138. See JOHN P. DWYER & PETER S. MENELL, PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY: A COMPARATIVE
INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 316 (1998) ("Courts today rarely grant prohibitory injunctions for
nuisance on the simple theory that the plaintiff is entitled to prohibit an invasion of his property
rights.").
139. Properties along the banks of the Ohio River were necessary for dock expansion. In addition,
AEP presumably needed storage space for the incoming coal and access to the riverfront land. Hence,
the company probably needed to acquire additional land for its planned expansion.
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victims of pollution to choose between settlement and litigation. The case
of Cheshire is illustrative. One can create high- and low-end estimates of a
resident's expected return from refusing to sell and instead seeking an injunction against AEP. The point of this exercise is to approximate the
thought process of pollution victims who must decide, under real-world
conditions, which course of action to pursue. The numbers are perforce
highly imprecise and should be used only to give a rough, back-of-theenvelope measure of the orders of magnitude involved.
As just shown, Ohio's nuisance law might have allowed the residents
of Cheshire to obtain an injunction against AEP. What are the possible implications of this finding? Let's assume the probability of an injunction
actually issuing was between 30% and 60%. An injunction that issued
probably would order AEP to abate the nuisance without specifying a particular method for achieving this outcome. AEP would rationally attempt
the least costly means of abatement first. The least costly means would
most likely be the magnesium-calcium injections described earlier,t4 with
an estimated cost of between $14 and $21 million. 141 This technology has
some finite chance of substantially eliminating the nuisance (estimated to
be between 70% and 90%). Assuming the first remedy failed, AEP probably could eliminate most or all of the blue plume by switching to lowsulfur coal, thereby reducing its sulfur trioxide emissions. This alternative
might cost between $100 and $200 million, with an 80% to 95% chance of
successfully eliminating the nuisance. Finally, if all else failed, AEP could
shut down the plant, the value of which is roughly $2 to $3 billion. Table 2
summarizes these estimates and a calculation of the value to the residents
of securing an injunction.

140. See Press Release, American Electric Power, supra note 45, and text accompanying note 49.
141.
Whether the cost of the technical solution is properly viewed as an advantage of securing an
injunction is not straightforward. AEP had apparently promised to clean up the sulfur trioxide
emissions (using this technical solution) even before it agreed to purchase the Cheshire properties.
Hence, an injunction securing the right to "force" AEP to do something that it was arguably going to do
without the injunction would be worth nothing to a Cheshire resident. On the other hand, if the only
reason for AEP's announcement that it would clean up the pollution was fear of litigation by the
residents, then the company might have decided not to install the cleanup technology once most of the
town agreed to sell. In that case, the right to force AEP to install this technology would be valuable to
any holdouts who obtained this right. If we assume that AEP would have installed the new technology
to comply with EPA regulations regardless of the outcome of the buyout, the gains from holding out
drop from $10.2 to $6 million.
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TABLE

2

EXPECTED BENEFIT OF REFUSING TO SELL AND
SEEKING AN INJUNCTION

(Dollar Figures Are in Millions)
Low
0.3
$14
0.1
$100

High
0.6
$21
0.3
$200

Probability clean coal will not solve the problem
Plant's shutdown value

0.05
$2,000

0.2
$3,000

Gross expected benefit of obtaining an injunction 142

$10.2

$156.6

Plus expected health damages (waived in case of
settlement)

0.1
$

$0.5

Less legal fees of 30%

$8.5

$129.2

Net present value

$5.9

$90.5

Probability of an injunction being granted
Cost of new technology
Probability new technology will not solve the problem
Additional cost of using clean coal

Under these assumptions, the gross expected value of refusing to sell
and obtaining an injunction ranges from $10.2 to $156.6 million.1 43 As
noted earlier, the lower estimate could be substantially smaller than $10.2
million if the odds of obtaining an injunction were significantly lower, or if
AEP would have installed the cleanup technology even without the threat
of litigation by the residents.
Health care costs are another piece of the settlement estimate. As part
of the buyout, the residents agreed to waive their future rights to sue for
health injury related to the plant's pollution. Estimating the probability and
cost of health problems is complex. That said, all current indications suggest that there is a relatively low chance of serious injury from the

142.
For purposes of this table, let p = probability of an injunction being granted, CNT = cost of
new technology, q = probability new technology will not solve the problem, CC = additional cost of
using clean coal, r = probability clean coal will not solve the problem, SV = shutdown value, GEB =
gross expected benefit of obtaining an injunction, then GEB =p[CNT+ q(CC + rSV)].
143.
Under our assumptions, the shutdown value of the plant has relatively little influence on the
final value of holding out because it is so unlikely that a shutdown would be necessary. Even if the
shutdown value were zero, it would only reduce the gross expected benefit to between $7.2 and $48.6
million.
The estimated likelihood of obtaining an injunction strongly affects the overall valuation. If the
chance of a successful injunction were only 10%, it would lower the gross value to S3.4 million, which
is still an order of magnitude larger than the sums individual residents actually received.
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exposure so far, so a reasonable estimate is that the expected damages
might range from $100,000 to $500,000.144
Even after deducting 30% to cover legal fees and allowing for the
time value of money, 45 the expected gain to a resident from litigating
against AEP is still substantial-in the range of $6 to $90 million. Not included in this calculation are any gains the residents might be able to extract from the adverse publicity that a nuisance suit would cause AEP. In
addition, if the residents were to prevail, their victory could precipitate
similar lawsuits against AEP in other locales. Moreover, a reputation as an
insensitive polluter could damage AEP politically, subjecting it to closer
regulatory scrutiny. 4 6 The potential damage to AEP's reputation weakens
AEP's bargaining position, thus increasing residents' incentive to pursue
an injunction.
2.

The Expansion Holdout

In explaining the Cheshire buyout, AEP insisted that it was in no way
related to fear of liability.'47 Instead, the company consistently argued that
the purpose of the deal was to secure necessary land for the construction of
an expanded coal-unloading facility, which would alleviate a bottleneck in
the plant's operation. Assuming that AEP was not bluffing, some residents-most likely those with riverfront property-were clearly in a position to block the deal by refusing to sell their property. As is the case with
all instances of coordinated development, each resident could refuse to
convey his fee simple to AEP, and any attempt to take the properties nonconsensually would be enjoined by trespass.
Notably, AEP never disclosed how many properties it needed to acquire to construct the dock, which hindered any resident's ability to predict
the extent of her holdout power. Residents' inability to determine the
credibility of AEP's plan to build the dock further eroded the company's
potential holdout problem. Furthermore, holding out with respect to the
dock plan, even if credible, creates a different threat point than winning an
injunction in a pollution suit. Blocking the construction of the new dock
144. Many residents are elderly and therefore would probably die before they experienced any
negative effects.
145.
Suppose litigation over nuisance liability, and the granting of an injunction, took four years
combined. At an annual interest rate of 5%, the present value of the $8.5 million would shrink to about
$5.9 million.
146. Of course, the reputational argument runs both ways. AEP's decision to deal with the
residents runs the risk of suggesting the company is a "soft touch," potentially subjecting the company
to threats of litigation from residents near its other facilities. AEP's characterization of the settlement as
a deal to purchase land for the expansion of the plant, rather than a settlement of a nuisance dispute,
may be designed to forestall such a reputational risk. By couching the transaction as a unique, sitespecific purchase, the company undermined the ability of potential litigants to rely on the Cheshire
precedent.
147. See, e.g., Teather, supra note 46.
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would have given the residents the ability to negotiate over additional profits AEP stood to gain from the expected reduction in operation costs, but
would not have affected the company's existing operation. Because AEP
never disclosed how much money it anticipated saving by building the new
dock, it is impossible to put a value on residents' ability to prevent AEP
from carrying out its plan.
3.

Summary

How did all this affect the residents' decision to sell? Clearly, significant intangibles were at stake in litigating the Cheshire pollution dispute.
Some of the uncertainties are so substantial that any attempt to assign dollar values to various outcomes and then arrive at an overall expected value
to the plaintiffs is hopeless. Yet even on a very conservative (prodefendant)
calculation, a successful litigant stood to collect millions of dollars.
Based on the expected payout from litigation described above, one
would assume some Cheshire residents would have found the gains from
suing were high enough to justify a refusal to sell on AEP's terms. But no
one did. Thus, it remains a puzzle why among the 220 residents of
Cheshire, not a single person concluded that litigating was preferable to
accepting AEP's offer.148 It is the task of the remainder of this Article to
explain why the residents left so much money on the table and to explore
the implications of this case for legal policy and economic theory.
IV
EXPLAINING THE ABSENCE OF HOLDOUTS

If standard law and economics analysis does not explain the failure of
Cheshire residents to bring a lawsuit against AEP, other factors must have
been decisive. This section incorporates into the analysis various nonlegal
factors that shaped the behavior of the parties. As will become clear, none
of these factors is particular to Cheshire; they have widespread applicability in pollution disputes. The incorporation of these factors leads to results
considerably different from those predicted by law and economics models.
The empirical approach utilized here reveals that the role of law is much
more limited than is commonly assumed and that to the extent law is relevant it is for reasons not commonly addressed by standard theory.149
148. A handful of residents refused to sell to AEP. Although these residents had various reasons
for refusing to sell, none indicated an intention to seek a higher payoff by suing AEP or by blocking
construction of the dock. Thus, the few owners who refused to deal are not really holdouts because they
lack the critical strategic motivation. Rather, as we explain in greater detail in Part V, infra, they are
better termed "holdins," who place an extraordinarily high subjective value on their continued presence
in Cheshire.
149. One possible explanation for the buyout that we do not discuss but that we cannot completely
rule out is that the residents decided to sell based on the legal advice they received. Specifically, the
residents' lawyers may have preferred to collect the attorney fees provided to them under the buyout
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A.

Ignorance of the Law

One possible explanation of Cheshire residents' failure to bring a lawsuit against AEP is simply that they were uninformed about the law. In his
classic study of land use disputes in Shasta County, California, Robert
Ellickson found that residents rarely resorted to legal action because of the
high cost of learning legal rules, as well as a preference for resolving disputes extralegally, even when the parties knew the rules. 5 ' Although
Cheshire is also a rural community, the cost of learning the law likely
played no role in residents' decision not to sue. On the contrary, the stakes
here were high enough so that both AEP and the residents of Cheshire obtained legal representation, and lawyers played a key role in the eventual
buyout agreement. Nevertheless, Ellickson's work is instructive in that it
highlights the importance of viewing things from the perspective of affected parties.
B.

Social Norms

In attempting to explain the absence of holdouts in Cheshire, one of
the first factors that comes to mind is social norms. Many studies have established the potential of social norms to coordinate behavior, especially in
small communities such as Cheshire. The works of Ellickson, 5 ' Lisa Bernstein,'5 2 Richard McAdams,' 53 Elinor Ostrom,' 54 and Eric Posner,' among
others, repeatedly demonstrate the ability of close-knit groups to prevent
individual members from acting strategically and to encourage them to act
instead in a way that maximizes group welfare. Cheshire was a close-knit
community with strong interpersonal ties among its residents, thus satisfying some preconditions for the formation of social norms.
Although social norms may have curbed to some extent the incentive
to hold out, they were not on their own responsible for the outcome in
agreement, a reported $4.5 million, rather than litigate and face the uncertainty of trial. All our attempts
to investigate this possibility by interviewing the residents failed, and the lawyers refused to talk to us
about the substance of the case. We stress that we have no information supporting this theory, but it
remains a possibility.
150. ELLICKSON, supra note 8, at 123-36. The irrelevance of law parallels Ellickson's findings
from Shasta County, albeit for different reasons. In Shasta County, law was largely irrelevant because it
was supplanted by social norms and because the cost of learning the law was too high. Id. In Cheshire,
people seemed aware of their legal rights but could not make use of them because extralegal factors
superseded them. It is important to note, moreover, that the disputes Ellickson chronicled in Shasta
County took place among community insiders; in Cheshire, the dispute was essentially between the
community and an outsider-the AEP's Gavin Plant.
151.
Id.
152. See Bernstein, supra note 16.
153. See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MIct. L.
REV. 338 (1997); Richard H. McAdams, Comment, Accounting for Norms, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 625.
154. See, e.g., Elinor Ostrom, Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms, 14 J. ECON.
PERSP. 137 (2000).
155.
See generally ERIC A. POSNER, SOCIAL NORMS (2000).
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Cheshire. The social norms story runs into two separate problems. First,
social norms are most effective when repeated interaction among group
members is expected.' 56 When they are likely to encounter each other
again, individual members have an incentive to abide by the social norms
because the long-term benefits they derive from the community exceed the
immediate gains they can get from deviation. 5 7 Social norms are enforced
through a "tit-for-tat" mechanism, under which present deviations will be
punished in similar transactions in the future. Obviously, none of these
conditions obtain in the Cheshire case, because the dispute with AEP was a
onetime occurrence, and, if successful, the buyout would dissolve the village. Second, the buyout offer did not require unanimous consent from the
residents but only simple majority approval. Although AEP might have
relied on social pressure to forge the requisite majority, such pressure cannot adequately explain the decision of almost all the residents to agree to
the buyout.
Consequently, social norms are not a plausible explanation for the
absence of holdouts in Cheshire. More generally, this analysis casts doubt
on the ability of social norms to prevent holdouts in dissolving communities. The more plausible explanation for the cooperative behavior in
Cheshire lies in the interdependence among individual residents in closeknit communities created by the amenities that such communities provide.
Thus, although norms per se are not responsible for the end result, the focus on social interaction highlighted in the norms literature provides a
helpful reference point for the following analysis.
C.

The Realities of Nuisance

The cut-and-dried discussions of nuisance disputes in classrooms and
stylized articles fail to capture the essence of nuisance situations. The legal
focus of the discussions blinds readers to nonlegal factors that regulate the
behavior of parties to a much greater extent than the law does. In this section, we highlight two factors relevant to Cheshire residents in their decision whether to hold out: the harsh reality of living with pollution and the
reputational stakes for the company.
1. Living Near a Polluter
Unlike other torts, pollution, as a continuous tort, has a daily effect on
residents. This factor dramatically diminishes the viability of litigation as a
solution for pollution victims, especially those with children. The constant
fear and inconvenience Cheshire residents experienced made them largely
indifferent to how much they could get by holding out. The case of Ron
Hammond is representative. A high school teacher, Ron moved to Cheshire
156.

ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 12-14 (1984).

157.

See generally MICHAEL TAYLOR, COMMUNITY, ANARCHY AND LIBERTY 65-90 (1982).
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in 1985 when he was still single. He later married and started a family.
Ron's oldest daughter suffers from severe asthma. Although Ron does not
blame AEP for his daughter's medical condition, he does attest that AEP's
pollution made his daughter's life, and that of the family as a whole, virtually unbearable. The pollution aggravated his daughter's preexisting condition, and on several occasions she required hospitalization. To minimize
their daughter's exposure to pollution, the Hammonds took extreme precautions. Every day they checked the sulfur dioxide monitor at the town
hall, and, when the pollution count was high, they did not let their daughter
play outside. To allow their daughter to ride her bike, the Hammonds were
forced to travel twenty miles each way. Every day was a challenge.' 58
For the Hammonds, exhausting the course of litigation was not an option; their goal was to leave Cheshire as soon as possible. As Ron
Hammond stated, "I would leave yesterday, if I could."' 59 But the
Hammonds' only asset was their property, and their property was worthless
because of the pollution. 6 ° The pollution placed the Hammonds in a terrible bind: it simultaneously provided them with a strong incentive to leave
and deprived them of the ability to do so. The Hammonds made it clear to
everyone that they would leave at the first opportunity. For them, the buyout offer could not have come soon enough. Their concern for their children's health trumped any monetary consideration. Ron firmly believes
that their continued stay in Cheshire adversely affected the long-term
health of his children. Holding out in the hope of receiving more money
from AEP was an inconceivable strategy.
Other residents with children echoed the sentiment. Jennifer Harrison
stated that on certain days when the blue plume blanketed the town, her
children, who were perfectly healthy, suffered from debilitating headaches
and respiratory difficulties. She too strove to find a way to get her children
out of Cheshire. 6 ' Indeed, it is hard to think of a parent who would risk the
future of her children in exchange for a larger amount of money. The children's health factor therefore played a much greater role in the decisionmaking process of the residents than did the rights and powers the law afforded them. No standard discount rate could capture the time value for the
residents. To residents with children, the potential cost of staying was simply prohibitive. But leaving was also difficult or impossible. The residents
faced a real-world liquidity constraint that theoretic models of nuisance
disputes conveniently overlook.

Hammond, supra note 47.
158.
159. Id.
160. In theory, it might have been possible for the Hammonds to move out and rent their property
to someone else. However, this solution was essentially foreclosed by the thin market for properties in
Cheshire, which vanished altogether after the blue plume began to appear in 2001.
Harrison II, supra note 35.
161.
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Other residents who could not afford to wait, but for a different reason, were Cheshire's elderly residents. They were concerned that they
would not live to see the outcome of the litigation. Residents revealed to us
that their lawyers estimated that the litigation process, with all the appeals,
could take ten years. For many of the residents in their seventies and eighties, litigation was a dubious prospect, the benefits of which they would
never reap.
The length and cost of litigation made law largely irrelevant for some
residents of Cheshire. Conversely, these factors gave substantial leverage
to AEP in negotiating a buyout deal in the (relatively short) shadow of the
law and the (much longer) shadow of its stacks, for at least a portion of the
town.
2. ReputationalStakes
Another factor that seems to have played a more important role than
law did in the Cheshire story was media coverage. Indeed, the media were
instrumental in leveling the playing field. The residents realized AEP's
sensitivity to reputational harm relatively early in their struggle. Originally,
AEP's operations were causing not only pollution but also excessive noise.
After residents' complaints fell on deaf ears, the residents decided to bring
their grievances to the local press. The effect of the media exposure on
AEP was immediate; it corrected the noise problem right away. However,
by so doing, it betrayed a weak spot for negative media coverage.162
The residents took full advantage of this Achilles' heel. They were
able to interest the Columbus Dispatch in their struggle, and the result was
' The newspaa series of articles entitled "Cheshire-Death of a Village."163
per even volunteered to conduct a laboratory test, at its own expense, to
determine whether the soil in the village was contaminated. Furthermore,
the town invited Mary Beth Lane, a Dispatch reporter, to spend a month in
Cheshire. She accepted the invitation.
AEP's two-pronged reaction demonstrates its sensitivity to negative
media coverage. First, it tried to demonstrate to journalists that it was making a sincere effort to curb the problem. For example, during Mary Beth
Lane's sojourn in Cheshire, AEP apparently started experimenting with
clean, low-sulfur coal-an experiment the company discontinued after the
journalist's departure." 6 Second, and simultaneously, AEP, whose headquarters are located in Columbus, attempted to discredit the Dispatch's
coverage in the Ohio business community. For example, according to Mary
Beth Lane, "[t]he company has voiced its concern, from time to time, about
162. Id.
163. The capital of Ohio, Columbus, is located about two hours' drive from Cheshire; the
Dispatch is the region's most important newspaper.
164. Harrison II, supranote 35.
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the number of stories we have published about Cheshire and the tone of the
stories. AEP [thought] the newspaper ha[d] gone overboard on the
coverage.' 1 65 And Ben Marrison, the editor of the Dispatch, told us that
"[AEP] has tried to chide us for our coverage, making remarks about our
coverage being excessive, and calling the [']Dispatch['] the 'Cheshire
Dispatch.""' t6 6 Of course, the Dispatch was not the only media outlet interested in the Cheshire story. The blue plume attracted considerable attention
from national and international news media after AEP made the buyout
67

offer. 1

Media involvement provided a strong inducement to AEP to bring
closure to the Cheshire problem as soon as possible. The bad press seems
to have been a thorn in AEP's side. It is quite possible, as some residents
suggested, that AEP considered the amount paid to residents to be
"shut-up" money. 68 The press's continuous interest in Cheshire helped
offset the time factor-that is, residents' desire to leave Cheshire quickly
because of the pollution-that favored AEP.
The discussion to this point has explained why some residents were
reluctant to hold out and has explored AEP's motivation to settle. However, for a full view of what happened in Cheshire it is imperative to consider another, more important factor-community externalities-a subject
to which we turn next.
D.

Community Externalities

Although the problem of living with pollution explains why some
residents were reluctant to hold out, it does not explain why no resident did
so. To get a full understanding of what happened in Cheshire, we must
consider community externalities.
A community provides certain benefits for individuals that they would
not otherwise be able to enjoy. 169 One set of benefits consists of amenities
such as schools, parks, police and health services, and even stores. Some
are classic public goods, whereas others, such as schools and stores, may
be provided privately but cannot exist without sufficient demand to cover

165.
Email from Mary Beth Lane, Reporter, Columbus Dispatch, to the authors (Feb. 12, 2003)
(on file with authors).
166. Email from Ben Marrison, Editor, Columbus Dispatch, to the authors (Feb.12, 2003) (on file
with authors).
167.
See. e.g., ABC Nightly News (ABC television broadcast, May 13, 2002) (airing a report by
Barry Serafin entitled "Residents of Cheshire, Ohio Move out of Their Polluted Town"); On the Record
(FOX News television broadcast, May 13, 2002) (airing an interview by Greta Van Susteren with
Cheshire resident Ron Hammond and AEP spokesman Pat Hemlepp); Seelye, supra note 53.
168.
Harrison II, supra note 35.
169.
See generally Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J.
549, 572-79 (2001) (discussing the social and economic effects stemming from communities).
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their fixed costs of operation. 7 ° A second important set of benefits that
communities provide stems from the social interactions that they themselves make possible. Ties of friendship are goods most people value
highly and actively seek out. Such interpersonal networks often arise from
physical proximity and commonality of interest over long stretches of
time.'17 Because of these benefits, each resident in a community has a stake
in the continued presence of other members and simultaneously bestows a
benefit on others by his own presence.
Communities give rise to externalities because each individual member does not take account of the benefits she provides to others in the
community when deciding whether to depart. Alan Ehrenhalt's description
of the parish of St. Nicholas of Tolentine on Chicago's southwest side during the 1950s provides an example of how such externalities arise.'72 Part
of the way residents participated in community life was by sitting out on
their stoops and chatting, gossiping, and watching each other. Ehrenhalt's
account makes clear that each resident valued such interactions very
highly. With the advent of television, however, residents tended to withdraw from their stoops to their living rooms, where their solitary activities
did nothing to foster the community. This withdrawal does not indicate that
residents placed no value on community but rather that they failed to take
account of the externalities inherent in supporting community by neglecting the impact of their own withdrawal on their neighbors. By withdrawing
from the community to watch television in private, each resident not only
increased his own consumption possibilities but also diminished those
available to his fellow residents, an effect of which residents are unlikely to
take full account. One might term this lack of consideration for one's
influence on the community the John Donne effect.'73 The Donne effect
played a significant role in Cheshire, for reasons we now explore.

170. There are actually two large bodies of literature on the economics of cities. The older
literature views the city as a kind of common property regime and stresses the divergence between
average and marginal congestion costs (and benefits), which can lead to inefficiencies. See, e.g.,
George S. Tolley, The Welfare Economics of City Bigness, I J. URB. ECON. 324 (1974). The newer
economic geography literature uses increasing returns and (positive) spillovers to explain the growth of
cities. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Increasing Returns and Economic Geography, 99 J. POL. ECON. 483
(1991). Edward Glaeser and others have also written about the importance of social networks or
community ties in cities. See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser, The Future of Urban Research: Nonmarket
Interactions, I BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON URB. AFF. 101 (2000).
171.
For examples of powerful evocations of the strength and vitality of such communities, see
EHRENHALT, supra note 17; ERIKSON, supra note 17. Robert Putnam's BOWLING ALONE, supra note
17, offers a mass of quantitative evidence for the decline of community in the United States after the
late 1950s.
172.

EHRENHALT, supra note 17, at 90-95.

173.
Donne wrote: "No man is an island entire of itself; every man is a piece of the Continent, a
part of the main." JOHN DONNE, DEVOTIONS UPON EMERGENT OCCASIONS, meditation 17 (1624).
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1. Fixed Costs, Availability, and Community Size
Most goods and services cannot be produced without incurring some
fixed costs. These setup costs introduce a "lumpiness" or indivisibility in
the availability of many commodities. Setting up a restaurant, gas station,
or grocery store requires expenditures that do not depend on the number of
customers served. Hence, such operations cannot be scaled down to an arbitrarily small size, because without enough customers they cannot cover
their fixed costs or operate at a profit. Given these fixed costs, and an inability to serve those who live outside a limited geographic boundary, the
availability of goods and services at a particular locale depends on the
population size and density. Therefore, it is not surprising that there is no
French restaurant in Fergus Falls, Minnesota, or classical radio station in
Ketchikan, Alaska; the local population with the requisite tastes is not large
enough to cover the fixed costs of these activities.'74
Individuals who live in the same geographic market therefore confer a
positive externality on each other: each helps defray the fixed costs of
providing goods or services that they all value. The magnitude of these
community externalities varies with community size. The larger the community is, the smaller the marginal effect each member has on the welfare
of others.
The application to Cheshire is straightforward. As a town of 220 people, it was big enough to support a gas station, a coffee shop, and two
churches. But if the town were to get much smaller, many of these institutions would be unlikely to survive. When a substantial chunk of the population appeared ready to leave, therefore, those who might have been
tempted to remain would certainly realize that the shrunken town could not
sustain many of these amenities, not to mention police or fire services or a
school.
In deciding whether to hold out in an effort to seek better terms from
the buyer, Cheshire residents had to consider the possibility that, if they did
so, they might be deprived of the basic social infrastructure that made them
want to stay in Cheshire. Refusing to sell a studio apartment in Manhattan
is quite different from remaining as the only resident in a ghost town. And
the possibility of being Cheshire's sole citizen was very real. In short, the
high cost of remaining in a town stripped of most of its amenities by the
174. Waldfogel calls the requirement of a sufficient number of residents to support a particular
service a "preference externality." See Joel Waldfogel, Preference Externalities: An Empirical Study of
Who Benefits Whom in Differentiated Product Markets, 34 RAND J. ECON. (2003). In the case of goods
that virtually everyone values-for example, groceries and gasoline-the externality depends only on
the size of the community, not on the tastes of its individual members. For examples of the unraveling
of communities caused by the loss of economies of scale when some residents left, see Peter T.
Kilbom, Mississippi Floods Drain Life from River Towns, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2002, at A15
(describing a gradual erosion of the business community in Winfield, Missouri, after residents started to
decamp).
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departure of many of its residents may have been a major reason for the
absence of holdouts.
2. Friendshipsand Community Networks
Beyond the joint defrayal of fixed costs in providing essential amenities, a second, and perhaps more important, set of externalities stems from
the closeness of small communities and the resulting interpersonal ties that
develop. Recent economic scholarship has suggested that friendships are a
' Such social capital complements market interacform of "social capital."175
tion by allowing actors to achieve mutually beneficial results, even when
contracting is impossible. Based on his study of Italy, Robert Putnam has
argued that communities characterized by close relationships of trust do
better than those in which members act atomistically.176 The presence of
community may be especially important for the poor, who rely on it as a
form of insurance or risk sharing.' 77
A complementary, and more compelling, characterization of friendships is that they are simply ends in their own right, independent of their
economic consequences. In either case, residents who are part of communities that foster such friendships often value them highly and experience
loss and alienation if they are destroyed.' 78
Almost every Cheshire resident willing to speak to reporters emphasized the closeness of the community.179 To be sure, not everyone harbored

175. See Glenn C. Loury, A Dynamic Theory of Racial Income Differences, in WOMEN,
MINORITIES, AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 153 (Phyllis A. Wallace & Annette M. LaMond eds.,
1977). For a critical assessment of this term, see Steven N. Durlauf, The Case "Against" Social
Capital,20 Focus 1, 1 (1999).
176. PUTNAM, supra note 16.
177. As Brion noted:
Especially among the poor, the existence of a matrix of mutually shared values
and.., concern and support is a necessary condition, not just to psychic well-being, but to
physical survival itself.... The poor must often depend on a web of mutual support... with
each individual contributing to the others whatever ... special talents he might have. When
[such] exchanges exist, they can.., reinforce [each other], creating a milieu the value of
which far exceeds what the physical reality might suggest. When this milieu is destroyed and
its members scattered, it is irretrievably lost.
Denis J. Brion, The Meaning of the City: Urban Redevelopment and the Loss of Community, 25 IND. L.
REV. 685, 702 (1991).
178. In addition to the sources cited already, consider the description of unsuccessful efforts to
rebuild towns in the floodplain of the Mississippi River after they were destroyed in the flood of 1993.
See Kilbom, supra note 174.
179. We are not trained ethnographers, and we were unable to make an extended visit to the town
or talk to a comprehensive cross section of the population. We recognize the possibility that residentsor the newspaper reporters who covered the story-may have had good reason to exaggerate the depth
and breadth of sentimental attachment to the town. Moreover, those willing to speak out could have
been disproportionately nostalgic or satisfied with things as they were. Nevertheless, we believe the
evidence of strong communal ties is compelling, especially because many residents had lived in the
town for many years; several families could trace their ancestry in the town back several generations.
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a sentimental attachment to the town. 8 ' But at least a substantial group did.
Jennifer Harrison, the town clerk and a supporter of the buyout, may have
put it best when she told us that before the buyout plan, the community had
been very close, "like Mayberry."'' Despite her support for the deal, she
expressed disappointment that the residents were all going to scatter when
the plan went through." 2
A poem written several decades ago by village resident Helen Preston
articulates the same feelings. It begins: "The little town of Cheshire where
I live is very, very small. / But it's home with precious happy memories to
us one and all." In an interview, Preston, age eighty-eight, revealed that her
family has lived in the immediate area for more than two hundred years; an
ancestor was born near Cheshire in 1800. Several generations of her family
are buried in the local cemetery, which is named for her great-grandfather
Benjamin McCarty and occupies the former site of the family's farm near
town. Preston's sense of connection with the past is palpable. "Family
history lives on in [her] living room as well, where she keeps photographs,
souvenirs and yellowed newspaper clippings in a large suitcase next to her
favorite armchair. She has a saying: 'If the house ever gets afire, grab that
suitcase."183

In another interview, Preston noted:
I'm between the devil and the deep blue sea ....All my friends
and neighbors are here and we'll be scattered like ducks. I'm not
able to just pick up 50 years worth of plunder and furniture and
move.... This little village has been my whole life. If a majority
sells, I don't want to just
sit here in the coal yard ....I reckon my
84
best bet is to get out.

180.

To some residents, "the crux of the deal is money: With the giant smokestacks, coal piles

and conveyor belts looming over Cheshire, their property values are shot. They're thrilled with what

they see as a once-in-a-lifetime chance to unload their homes for at least twice the assessed values."
Simon, supra note 36, at Al.
181.
Harrison I, supra note 1.
182.
Id.Another villager, Mary Fulton, grew up with her grandmother and great-grandmother as

neighbors. She chose another fictional analog for Cheshire-Grover's Comer, New Hampshire-and
remarked that "[Il]ife used to be simple here ....'Itwas like Our Town."' Buckley, supra note 28, at

IA. To be fair, one newspaper reporter said of Cheshire "It's country, but it's hardly Mayberry. Not
everyone knows everyone else. They lock their doors at night." Id.On the other hand, an Ohio reporter
observed that "[t]here are perhaps too many trailers in back yards for it to be picturesque, but it's wellkept and homey. It's... the kind of place where residents keep their doors unlocked and know the
names of every dog in town." James F. Sweeney, Town for Sale, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, June 9,
2002, at LI.
183.
Mary Beth Lane, Precious Memories, COLUMBus Disp., July 7, 2002, at C 1.
184.
Tim Jones, Electric Plant Finally Overtakes Small Ohio Town, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 11,2002, at

Al. Other Cheshirites describe a deep emotional attachment not just to the people of the town but to the
site itself and its scenic location on the banks of the Ohio River. "'It becomes a part of you, and you
become attached to it ....I think, as opposed to blood, I have Ohio River water coursing through my
veins."' Price, supra note 59, at B I (quoting Cheshire resident Elizabeth Bailey).
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Another indication of the strength of the community comes, paradoxically, from the animosity that developed in the wake of the decision to sell.
Some residents blamed those who engineered or supported the deal, even
though many in the latter group did so only reluctantly. This animosity
suggests that at least some sellers felt coerced into selling and agreed not
because they valued their property at less than the price offered by AEP,
but because they stood to lose both the value of their home and the value of
their community ties if they refused.
For example, Jeannie Elkins Mollohan, a forty-one-year-old grocery
store worker,
attended the local high school, River Valley High, and [was] trying
to organise [sic] a 25-year reunion for the class of 1978. "This is a
sad end for the town," she said. "I have a co-worker in his 50s who
lived there all his life with his mother and now they have to pull up
situation and for the
their roots. What else can they do? It's a tragic
'
people affected I can see a righteous anger. 185
One early advocate of the sell-off found that his daughters "suffered
relentless teasing [at school]: 'Can I shake your hand?' classmates would
say. 'I've never shaken the hand of a millionaire before.' No one sat near
the family at high school football games."' 8 6 At one game, someone called
the father "Judas."' 8 7 Gladys Rife, another longtime resident, commented to
a reporter, "'Honey, listen, this deal has caused more problems. . . . Friend

against friend, neighbor against neighbor, family against family. So many
hard feelings. I'm praying it doesn't go through."" 88 In another example of
life imitating art, Gladys Rife was interviewed after "switch[ing] off an
'Andy Griffith Show' rerun with a snort of disgust. 'Cheshire is nothing
like that [anymore],' she says, gesturing to the TV screen."' 189 These reactions suggest that even with generous compensation, many residents believed they were coming out behind by selling. In other words, they may
have felt that AEP was undercompensating them for the loss of their
community.190

Interpersonal networks are costly to create and maintain, and much of
their value is not transferable to other locations. In that sense, friendships
resemble an investment in firm-specific human capital.' 9 Thus,
interpersonal ties are an asset that is bound to lose some of its value with
185.

Teather, supra note 46, at 3 (quoting Cheshire resident Jeannie Elkins Mollohan).

186.
187.
188.

Buckley, supra note 28.
Id.
Simon, supra note 36, at Al.

189. Id.
190. The residents' motivations were complex, and no single characterization can do justice to
them. For example, some who opposed the sale may have felt they were losing out relative to other
sellers, rather than being opposed to the sale per se.
191.

GARY BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL (3d ed. 1993).
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dramatic changes in the makeup of communities. The profound interdependence that exists in small, close-knit communities is responsible for
their cohesiveness and stability; it was certainly a hallmark of Cheshire.
But paradoxically the very cohesiveness of such communities may lead to
problems of undercompensation when the communities dissolve.
3.

Community Externalitiesand IndividualDecision Making

Interdependencies among individuals have long been known to affect
individual decision making. Perhaps the most famous example of this effect is Thomas Schelling's explanation for dynamic resegregation in the
housing market.' 92 In Schelling's tipping model, the exit of the least tolerant White property owners upon the entry of minority residents reduces the
attractiveness of the neighborhood for the remaining White residents and
precipitates their departure.' 93 Although Schelling worked on a different
problem, his analysis is illuminating in that it highlights the impact of
one's neighbors on one's own welfare in close communities and captures a
dynamic that also seems to account for the result in Cheshire.
The outcome in Cheshire may also be explained, in part, by analogy
to coercive tenders in corporate law. In a series of articles in the 1980s,
Lucian Bebchuk outlined the coercive effects of tender offers.'94 As
Bebchuk's analysis reveals, interdependencies among shareholders allow
for the possibility that a carefully designed purchase offer may make it rational for some owners to sell their shares at prices below what they believe the shares are worth.' 95 This coercion occurs because the offer to buy
immediately, explicitly or implicitly, contains a threat not to buy at all, or
to buy only at a lower price in the future. 196 The discount on future
purchases forces shareholders to choose between tendering their shares at
192. See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 140-55 (1978); Thomas
C. Schelling, A Process of Residential Segregation: Neighborhood Tipping, in RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
IN ECONOMIC LIFE 157 (Anthony H. Pascal ed., 1972); Thomas C. Schelling, Dynamic Models of
Segregation, 1 J. MATH. SOC. 143, 167-71 (1971).
193.
For critical discussion of Schelling's theory, see Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The
Integration Game, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1965, 1985-89 (2000) (delineating the limits of Schelling's
tipping model).
194.
See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Pressure to Tender: An Analysis and a Proposed Remedy, 12
DEL. J. CORP. L. 911 (1987) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Pressure to Tender]; Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Toward
Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1695 (1985)
[hereinafter Bebchuk, Undistorted Choice]; Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Comment, The Case for Facilitating
Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1028 (1982). Numerous others have noted these coercive
effects as well. See, e.g., Edward F. Greene & James J. Junewicz, A Reappraisal of Current Regulation
of Mergers and Acquisitions, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 647 (1984); Michael C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback,
The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5 (1983); Louis
Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposalfor Legislation, 83 COLM. L. REV.
249 (1983); Elliot J. Weiss, Defensive Responses to Tender Offers and the Williams Act's Prohibition
Against Manipulation, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1087 (1982).

195.
196.

Bebchuk, Undistorted Choice, supra note 194, at 1696.
Id.
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the "front-end" price specified in the offer or waiting and facing a lower,
"back-end" price if the takeover succeeds. 97 So long as the front-end price
is higher than the back-end price, a shareholder who believes that a tender
offer will succeed is best advised to sell immediately.' 98
Empirical studies indeed verify that the front-end share price specified
in tender offers generally exceeds the market share price both prior to the
announcement of the proposed takeover and subsequent to its successful
completion.'99 That is, the front-end price is usually the best price available
for a share, unless another suitor presents an offer superior to the initial
offer. Thus, even if a shareholder believes that the "true" value of the share
is greater than the front-end price of the share, he will tender his shares, so
long as he believes that the tender offer is likely to succeed. As several
commentators have noted, the tender offer places shareholders in the familiar position of players in a prisoner's dilemma, in which they are compelled to act against their own best interests.0 0
The analogy to communal buyouts is relatively straightforward. The
same group dynamics that prompt shareholders to tender their shares involuntarily may also spur members of small communities to sell their
properties to a polluter. The fear of being left at the back end, with the attendant adverse consequences, and the difficulty of coordinating a collective response may cause property owners to accept offers they would
otherwise reject. Analogizing to the corporate context, then, polluters
should be able to buy small towns at a price lower than the aggregate value
their residents assign to them.

197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See studies discussed in Bebchuk, Pressure to Tender, supra note 194; David W. Leebron,
Games CorporationsPlay: A Theory of Tender Offers, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 153 (1986); see also J.
Gregory Sidak & Susan E. Woodward, Takeover Premiums, AppraisalRights and the Price Elasticity
of a Firm's Publicly Traded Stock, 25 GA. L. REV. 783 (1991).
200. See, e.g., Bebchuk, Pressure to Tender, supra note 194; John C. Coffee Jr. & William A.
Klein, Bondholder Coercion: The Problem of Constrained Choice in Debt Tender Offers and
Recapitalizations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1207 (1991); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties That Bond Dual Class
Common Stock and the Problem of Shareholder Choice, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 3 (1988); Robert A.
Prentice, Front-End Loaded, Two-Tiered Tender Offers: An Examination of the Counterproductive
Effects of a Mighty Offensive Weapon, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 389 (1989).
There is much dispute about why front-end prices should be higher than back-end or pre-tenderoffer prices. Clearly, the raider believes that the shares are undervalued at market price, perhaps
because she believes that the market price does not sufficiently reflect the available information
concerning the target corporation's prospects for future earnings. Or it may be because the raider
believes that if she is able to take control of the corporation, she will be able to introduce superior
management or synergy, and thereby improve the target corporation's profitability. Or the raider may
intend to use control of the corporation illicitly to divert corporate profits away from the corporation
(and thereby away from the minority owners) to herself. For our purposes, the motives of the raider are
irrelevant. It is important only to note that the price differential between the front-end and back-end
prices pressures shareholders to tender.

2004]

SELLING MA YBERR Y

A simple numeric example illustrates the point. Assume that
Tinytown is a small community with two hundred residents, each of whom
owns an identical house with a market value of $100,000. All residents
also value the close nature of their community, but they vary in their valuation of this attribute: half value it at $20,000 and half at $80,000. Hence,
the total value of Tinytown to its residents is $30 million. Assume now that
Pacific Cement wishes to open a new plant in the vicinity of Tinytown.
The expected value of the new plant to Pacific is $25 million. However, the
plant will cause pollution that will render the residents' properties worthless. Rather than litigating, Pacific can offer to buy each resident's property
for $125,000. Even though the offered price is considerably lower than the
subjective valuation of half of the community members, all will agree to
sell. The low-value owners will sell because the offer price exceeds the
value they place on their continued residence in Tinytown. The high-value
owners will sell because they realize that once the low-value neighbors
depart, the community that they value at $80,000 will also vanish. 211 Of
course, this result is undesirable from an efficiency standpoint because the
value of the town to the residents as an ongoing entity exceeded its value to
the polluter.
In reality, additional factors may enhance residents' incentive to sell
at a discount. First, the distribution of values may be more variable and
may vary with the size of the community. Our example included only two
groups of owners, who placed high and low values on the community. In
reality, one should expect to find a continuum of valuations. This variation
in valuations should make it easier for a buyer to unravel the community
by picking off those most willing to leave. Second, the residents will have
to make the decision to sell under conditions of uncertainty about the
valuations of their neighbors. These valuations are private information that
may be neither observed nor verified. In many pollution settings, there is
no real market for the affected properties, and the polluter is effectively a
201.
True, they may still bring a lawsuit against Pacific Cement, but all they will be able to
recover now, if they win, is the market value of the property-that is, one hundred thousand dollars.
One might argue that the high-value owners could offer a Coasean "bribe" to the low-value owners to
induce them not to sell. In the scenario described in the text, a payment from the high-value owners to
the low-value owners of seven thousand dollars in exchange for not selling would leave both sets of
residents better off. Such a bribe is unlikely to work, however, for at least two reasons. First, the offer
of money necessarily undermines the very existence of the asset that is being "acquired"-that is,
friendship. Norms of friendship, by definition, are inconsistent with the monetization of community
that this bargain requires. See, e.g., John J. Donohue Ill, Prohibiting Sex Discrimination in the
Workplace: An Economic Perspective,56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1337, 1352 & n.44 (1989) (arguing that "the
very act of paying a bribe [to undo sex discrimination by an employer] will undermine the self-esteem
[of workers who have to pay the bribe. Hence,] there are some Coasean bribes that are intrinsically
incapable of achieving their goal."). Second, even setting this obvious problem aside and approaching
the matter from a purely economic perspective, such transfer payments are difficult to negotiate unless
each side knows the other's true valuation and the low-value owners can credibly commit not to sell if
the payment is made.
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monopsony, so coresidents lack any objective valuation measures. 0 2 In
Cheshire, for example, there had been no real estate transactions in the several years preceding the buyout offer. Finally, given that litigation is costly,
that its outcome is uncertain, and that home owners are risk averse,0 3 many
will be inclined to sell to the polluter-even at a steep discount-rather
than sue for damages.
Statements made by Cheshire residents provide some support for this
analysis. Scott Lucas, a seventy-year-old former mayor of Cheshire, commented: "[I] realize that even if there isn't any pollution, it sure looks like
there is .... [I] would have been happy to stay here .... The danger is, if

you don't sell [to the plant], your house probably won't be worth a
dime. ' '2' The story of the Macks echoes these sentiments. Married for
sixty-three years, Harold and Odella Mack, ages eighty-four and eightytwo, lived in Cheshire their entire lives. Both belonged to the Cheshire
Baptist Church for that entire period, and Harold, also a former mayor of
Cheshire, helped incorporate the village in 1953. They explained that their
decision to leave was not due to any health risks "but because everyone
else was pulling up stakes."2 5
An interview with one of the two owners who decided to stay confirms the theory that many residents sold to AEP because they feared the
consequences of remaining behind while others sold. The interviewee
spoke of a "great fear factor," especially among older residents. He said
that people were afraid to find themselves living in a "ghost town" if they
did not sell.2" 6 Several things AEP did contributed to residents' fear. First,
AEP gave departing owners salvage rights.2" 7 By permitting residents to
gut their houses, the salvage provision increased the likelihood that the
residences would forever remain uninhabitable. It also raised concerns
about exposure to asbestos and other hazards for those who remained.0 8
Second, Jennifer Harrison pointed out to us that it was rumored that AEP
was planning to turn the entire town into a coal heap.20 9 In combination,

202.

A monopsony is defined as a "situation in which one buyer controls the market." BLACK'S
1023 (7th ed. 1996).
203.
See, e.g., Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 290
(1988) ("Within a single lifetime, property tends to make the property owner more risk-averse.");
William K. Jones, Confiscation: A Rationale of the Law of Takings, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 6 (1995)
("Owners of property are typically risk-averse.").
204. Simon, supranote 36, atAl.
205.
Buckley, supra note 28, at IA.
206. Interview with Cheshire resident requesting anonymity, in Cheshire, Ohio (Feb. 10, 2003)
[hereinafter Anonymous Interview].
207.
Harrison II, supra note 35.
208. Anonymous Interview, supra note 206.
209. Harrison 1I,
supra note 35.
LAW DICTIONARY
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these developments made it all the more attractive to sell to AEP and bid
Cheshire good-bye.21 °
Our theory finds further support in the structure of the buyout offer.
AEP did not require the unanimous consent of Cheshire property holders.
Rather, it required a simple majority of residents to sell for the deal to
move forward. At first, the simple majority requirement seems puzzling
because it allowed many property owners to remain in place and sue AEP
in nuisance if they so chose. However, once we take into account community externalities, AEP's strategy makes perfect sense. AEP's insistence on
acceptance by a simple majority virtually guaranteed that the community
would "tip out," sending a signal to residents that selling was their only
real option.2 1 Cheshire, and virtually any community of its size, could not
remain viable after losing half of its members. It is true that, in principle,
AEP did not have to include any majority requirement. The fear of being
left at the back end should have prompted most, if not all, residents to sell.
Yet requiring majority approval as a precondition for the buyout served as
an additional antiholdout measure, providing further assurance that the deal
would go through.
What dynamic resegregation, corporate takeovers, and Cheshire have
in common is the existence of interdependencies among asset holders that
markets cannot fully capture. The specific interdependency at work in
Cheshire was that A's decision to sell her house influenced the value B
placed on his house. A's decision affects not only her own welfare but also
210. Id. Recent testimony, albeit from those who refused to sell, supports our contention that at
least some who sold did so out of fear. Gladys Rife, age 81, was offered a substantial sum for her land,
but refused to sell (although she did take AEP's offer of a life estate). She believes that "the residents
were pushed into the deal because of fears that they would not be able to sell their homes because of the
power plant, and by greed." James Doran, Town Takeover Is Blocked by Widows' Might, TIMES
(London), Nov. 17, 2003, at 13 (describing Ms. Rife's views). She commented that "'[t]his whole thing
is crazy. We got shafted .... People were given no time to think about it. They took their money like
idiots. Now a lot of them are sorry and they want to come back. But they can't."' Id.
Testimony from Beula Hem (another life estate holder) confirms this view. Interviewed on National
Public Radio, Ms. Hem commented that
[W]hen we [the town] started this it wasn't to sell. It was to clean up their [AEP's] act. We
wasn't asking them to buy us out. We were told that if we didn't sell our property, that we
wouldn't get anything out of it because this plant had destroyed the value of our property.
That's why people sold. And now there's a lot of people that's moved now that's very
unhappy. Said they'd like to be back. They wish they'd stuck with me. And I've asked them,
'Why did you sell?' Said, 'Well, was afraid not to,' said, 'because they painted such a dark
picture.'
Bula [sic] Hem Discusses Keeping Her Home in What's Now the Ghost Town of Cheshire, Ohio
(National Public Radio broadcast, Nov. 15, 2003) [hereinafter Hem Interview].
211.
AEP might have been able to get a better deal by offering to buy only half of the property at a
premium over the fair market value-say, from the first forty-five residents who agreed to sell. This
approach likely would have been even more coercive to residents and probably would have enabled
AEP to acquire the remaining properties at a discount from their market price. However, this strategy
might have backfired, leading either to bad publicity for AEP or to increased enmity on the part of
those residents who did not get the premium, which in turn could have increased the likelihood of
litigation. See Farnsworth, supranote 94.
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that of all members of the relevant community. In sum, A's action generates an externality that other members of the community must bear. It is
important to note in addition the temporal dimension of the problem. Those
who sell early get to cash out at an attractive price, whereas those who stay
end up with an asset that has been substantially devalued. Reasoning
backward, rational asset holders should see little choice but to get out immediately rather than wait for the inevitable decline to occur. Naturally, the
sell-fast strategy plays into the hands of potential acquirers-be they
blockbusters, corporate raiders, or industrial polluters-who can then buy
assets for less than their true value.
Social scientists have repeatedly noted the ability of small communities, by virtue of their cohesiveness, to overcome problems of free riding in
the provision of collective amenities such as irrigation systems, roads, and
other local public goods. The closeness and cohesion of small communities
enable a lifestyle that is unavailable elsewhere and that residents may view
as a premium offered by these locales. Paradoxically, the same cohesiveness and close interpersonal ties render members of small communities
particularly vulnerable to the threat of buyouts and exercises of eminent
domain. 2 ' Potential takers can exploit the existence of community externalities to acquire assets on the cheap, even when doing so is unfair and
possibly even inefficient. Correspondingly, members of small communities
stand to be seriously undercompensated when their communities unravel,
even when they consensually agree to sell.
The case of Cheshire has several normative implications for legal theory and policy. The three areas we discuss are tort theory, collective action
theory, and takings theory. We will show that, in all three areas, Cheshire
suggests some important refinements and policy changes. The lessons of
Cheshire warrant close attention because, in the aftermath of the Cheshire
buyout, several other communities are weighing the options of reaching
similar deals with polluters." 3 Thus, the normative discussion provided in
this Article may guide the behavior of polluters and residents in future
deals.
V
IMPLICATIONS FOR TORT THEORY

The standard analysis of pollution disputes posits a binary menu of
remedies consisting of damages and injunctive relief. The academic literature treats the choice of remedy as the exclusive dominion of the court,
over which parties exert no influence.2 14 Indeed, the project of law and
212. We discuss eminent domain in Part VII, infra.
213.
See examples cited supra note 11.
214. See, e.g., Richard R.W. Brooks, The Relative Burden of Determining Property Rules and
Liability Rules: Broken Elevators in the Cathedral,97 Nw. U. L. REV. 267, 267 (2002) (pointing out
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economics scholars has been to instruct courts on how to choose the optimal remedy.21 On this view, the polluter's and the residents' actions cannot affect a court's choice of remedy. 216 However, this view misses a key
feature of the law of remedies that may work to the advantage of polluters-the internal hierarchy between damages and injunctions. A basic
maxim in the law of remedies is that injunctive relief is a residual remedy
to which courts should resort only when damages cannot adequately redress the plaintiffs harm. As a dissenting Supreme Court Justice stated in
Bowen v. Massachusetts, "even though a plaintiff often prefers a judicial
order preventing a harmful act or omission before it occurs, damages after
the fact are considered an 'adequate remedy' in all but the most
27
extraordinary cases.""
In other words, the judicial determination of remedies involves a twostep process. First, the court must decide whether monetary damages adequately redress the wrong. Second, if the court decides that damages are
218
inadequate in a particular case, it will grant the plaintiff injunctive relief.
As we will show, polluters (and other private "takers") can take advantage
that of the various tasks facing the courts, "none is more important than choosing how to protect the
rights and entitlements of the parties who appear before them").
215. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to
Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027 (1995); Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 10; Louis
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV.
L. REV. 713 (1996); James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Essay, Property Rules and Liability
Rules: The Cathedralin Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440 (1995).
216. One might argue that because courts take into account the respective loss to each of the
litigants, and hence will consider the polluter's profits, the polluter actually affects the court's decision
by determining the size and profitability of its operations. This inference is unwarranted for two
reasons. First, it is not the size of the polluter, or even its profitability, that matters, but rather the cost
of abatement. See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 15-26 (2d ed.
1989). The misplaced focus on size, we suspect, stems from the notoriety of the decision in Boomer v.
Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970), in which the court compared the value of the cement
plant's operation to the harm to the residents. Boomer, however, is unrepresentative; in Boomer, the
polluter allegedly had no way to abate other than to shut down the plant. The situation is different in
most other cases, as our analysis of Cheshire demonstrates. See discussion supra Part II1.A.2. Second,
the forces of supply and demand determine the polluter's size and profitability. In other words, the
market-not the probability of an injunction in a future lawsuit-determines how much polluters earn.
217. 487 U.S. 879, 925 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Various state courts historically have treated
injunctions in a similar manner. See, e.g., Amdor v. Cooney, 43 N.W.2d 136, 140 (Iowa 1950)
("[I]njunctions are granted sparingly, with caution and only in clear cases."); Cline v. Franklin Pork,
Inc., 361 N.W.2d 566, 568 (Neb. 1985) ("An injunction against a nuisance is an extraordinary remedial
process which is granted not as a matter of right but in the exercise of the sound discretion of the court,
to be determined on consideration of all the circumstances of each case."); Aldridge v. Saxey, 409 P.2d
184, 189 (Or. 1965) ("It is everywhere held that equity jurisdiction to enjoin an alleged nuisance is
").But see LAYCOCK, supra note 22, at vii (suggesting that
exercised sparingly and cautiously ....
plaintiffs are usually successful in getting the remedy they seek).
218. As a general rule, polluters will always favor damages over injunctions. A damage award
deprives the residents of compensation for subjective value and eliminates their ability to hold out. The
shift from injunctive relief to damages led Judge Jasen, dissenting in Boomer, to caution that the
remedy ordered by the majority gives private parties the power of eminent domain. Boomer, 257
N.E.2d at 876-77 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
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of this two-step process to diminish the likelihood of an injunction being
issued against them. As explained above, the fear of being left at the back
end could spur a substantial percentage of residents of small communities
to accept a buyout, even if the proposed price is below their subjective
value of their property. Thus, regardless of a court's determination, a polluter will be able to buy out some percentage of a town.
Some owners who place particularly high subjective value on their
property likely will refuse to sell. The reasons for the refusal may be ideological or pragmatic. Some owners may turn the deal down out of anger at
the polluter.219 Others may find the price offered to them too low A group
that should be especially reluctant to sell is elderly residents. Elderly people who have lived in the same residence for decades may have an
especially strong psychological and emotional attachment to their homes,
and hence their subjective value may be well in excess of the market value
of their property. In addition, the costs of moving and starting afresh in a
new place are likely to be inordinately high for members of this group. Yet
elderly owners are not the only ones who may refuse to deal. Residents
with a preference for seclusion and isolation or who embrace an antipollution ideology may elect to remain in their homes even after a community
unravels. Finally, residents who do not value community as highly as other
residents may prefer to stay and sue the polluter in the hope of obtaining an
injunction, which they can later parlay into a better bargain than their peers
received. Such persons are willing to incur short-term losses in exchange
for greater long-term gains. Their refusal to deal is strategic, and accordingly they are "holdouts."
Residents from any of these groups, particularly the potential holdouts, present a problem for polluters who are willing to engage in a buyout.
For if residents who do not go along with a buyout may sue and get an injunction, the buyout deal no longer makes sense for the polluter. Any individual plaintiff who obtains an injunction can extract the lion's share of the
bargaining surplus from the polluter, and ideological holdouts may refuse
to sell back the injunction altogether. Why, then, would polluters engage in
buyout negotiations? Or, in the context of Cheshire, why did AEP decide to
move forward with the deal even though a handful of residents announced
they were not going to sell and indeed acted as promised?
The answer to this question likely inheres in, the judicial practice of
denying injunctive relief when damages provide adequate compensation.
This practice means that a favorable response to a buyout offer from the
219. For a discussion of whether policy makers should consider enmity in fashioning legal
remedies, compare Ward Farnsworth, The Economics of Enmity, 69 U. CHi. L. REv. 211, 211 (2002)
(arguing that generally courts should disregard enmity in deciding legal remedies) with Eric A. Posner,
Law and Emotions, 89 GEO. L.J. 1977, 2006-10 (2001) (proposing that courts deny property rule
protection when enmity taints plaintiffs' relationships with defendants).
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majority of the affected residents dramatically reduces, if not eliminates,
the ability of those who refuse to sign on to get an injunction. That the majority of residents agreed to take money as compensation for the pollution
provides evidence that no injunctive relief is necessary to correct the harm.
The higher the share of owners who have agreed to sell, the smaller the
probability that those who refuse to sell will get an injunction.22 Given that
injunctive relief is an equitable remedy granted at the court's discretion, it
is highly unlikely that a court would empower 1% of property owners to
enjoin the operation of the polluter if the remaining 99% went along with
the buyout. Injunction in this situation is especially unlikely in light of the
modem trend to award injunctive relief parsimoniously in nuisance
cases.

22 1

If this analysis is correct, the dependence of injunctions on the adequacy of damages should discourage and in all likelihood eliminate strategic holdouts. Residents who decide not to sell and decide to sue instead
may in the end get the same amount of money their former neighbors received by agreeing to the buyout. But the recalcitrant residents will get it at
a much higher cost; they will have incurred the costs of litigation. Therefore, the buyout price set by the polluter, with some minor adjustments,
will become the "damage award" the polluter will end up paying to all affected residents-those who sell immediately and those who take their
grievance to court. Thus, by making a buyout offer that will be acceptable
to the average property owner, the polluter effectively purchases immunity
against holdouts-and against litigation in general. The buyout mechanism
allows the polluter both to set the parameters of the legal relationship with
residents and to exert control over the judicial election of remedies. Or, put
differently, the use of buyout mechanisms enables polluters to
"endogenize" injunctions.222
The upshot of our discussion is that buyout mechanisms may clear the
way to private takings. Formally, only the government may take private
property without the owner's consent, and it may do so only if it pays the
owner just compensation.223 Private actors are not endowed with a similar
power; as against these "takers," a property rule protects an owner's fee
The desire to take an injunction off the table might explain the 50% requirement posted by
220.
AEP. Acceptance by a simple majority is probably the bare minimum necessary to show that a legal
remedy is adequate under the circumstances. A lower acceptance rate would be meaningless for AEP,
making it better for AEP not to have dealt at all. The simple majority requirement therefore served as a
safety valve that enabled AEP to annul the bargain if it failed to achieve sufficient support among
Cheshire residents.
See Lewin, supra note 104, at 198 (describing the erosion of injunctive relief as the
221.
paradigmatic remedy in nuisance suits).
By "endogenizing" injunctions, we mean influencing the probability of injunctive relief being
222.
granted. The probability does not drop to zero, however; courts still retain equitable discretion over the
decision.
223.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
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simple interest. In practice, however, private actors may force property
owners to sell their property for a price lower than their own private valuations by making a buyout offer to members of the relevant community. As
demonstrated, the risk of being left at the "back end," without community
amenities and without interpersonal networks, is likely to force property
owners to surrender their interests in exchange for the price offered by the
private taker. As long as the polluter's offer is above market value, a majority of owners in the relevant community will agree to tender their titles.
As explained, moreover, the majority's decision to accept the buyout offer
will likely dramatically diminish the minority's probability of securing injunctive relief against the polluter. The interdependence among community
members is not merely practical but also legal, and it acts to deprive certain
property owners of the power to sell at a price of their choice, changing the
nature of the protection of their right from a property to a liability rule.
The explanation for the absence of holdouts also explains the presence
of "holdins"-residents who chose to remain in Cheshire after the buyout
but who did not initiate litigation against AEP. The term "holdout" connotes a strategic motivation. A holdout's refusal to deal is grounded in the
desire to extract as high economic rents as possible from the other party to
the transaction. To succeed, a holdout must be in possession of a unique
asset and must be able to determine the price of that asset. In other words,
holdouts critically depend on property rule protection. Classic holdout settings involve indivisible projects, such as the construction of a new interstate highway for which the federal government must acquire all the
properties along the planned course. In such a case, any single owner can
block the entire project by refusing to sell. Nuisance cases are different
because the nuisance causer does not have to acquire title to all affected
properties to continue its operations. Once the threat of an injunction disappears, a polluter can pay damages and continue to carry out its activities.
Absent the ability to get an injunction, pollution victims cannot hold out.
At present, however, the term "holdout" is attached to any person who
refuses to deal for whatever reason. This colloquial use fails to capture the
essence of the phenomenon, a strategic attempt to extract rents. Not all
property owners who refuse to deal fit this description. In Cheshire, for
instance, a handful of elderly residents rejected AEP's buyout offer for
various reasons. Some placed a high subjective value on their continued
stay in Cheshire. Their decision to stay was not motivated by a desire to do
better than their neighbors who chose to sell. In fact, some may not have
sold for any price. It is rumored that Jay Hall, who lives just outside of
Cheshire but has property within the town limits, told several people that
"AEP just can't pay enough to buy me out."
No effort to extract a better offer from the buyer accompanied these
residents' refusal to sell. And, indeed, the preceding analysis of the law of
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remedies suggests that they would fail to enjoin AEP even if they were to
try. Therefore, actors with high subjective valuations are not holdouts and
should not be treated as such. Instead, owners who attach high idiosyncratic value should be termed "holdins." Whether the law should treat
holdouts and holdins in the same way is a difficult question left for another
occasion.
The categories of holdouts and holdins can over time shade into one
another. The stories of the two resident owners who decided to stay provide an interesting illustration of this possibility. Beula "Boots" Hem, an
eighty-two-year-old widow, has lived in Cheshire all her life. Neighbors
describe Ms. Hem as a feisty, even "cantankerous," person, who was at the
forefront of the campaign against AEP.224 Thus, her neighbors were surprised at her decision not to sell. 22 5 But on closer inspection, this decision
may not be surprising at all. It seems that the struggle against AEP gave
Ms. Hem a unique personal satisfaction; it clearly got her substantial attention from the media. The campaign against AEP's pollution may have become Ms. Hem's raison d'tre.226
The other resident owner who decided not to sell spoke to us on condition of anonymity. He grew up in Cheshire as a "Huck Finn on the
river. '227 He later left Cheshire, but his lifelong dream was to retum to his
boyhood home and build a house on the bank of the Ohio River. After retiring, he retumed to Cheshire and now lives there with his wife in a mobile home. The buyout put their plan to build a new house on hold. The
couple's attitude toward AEP was clearly marked by indignation. The resident owner told us in no uncertain terms: "For a public company to buy a
town like that should be illegal." He was upset with AEP for not being a
better neighbor and hoped that the Cheshire community would one day be
revived, possibly with AEP's help. The couple decided to stay in Cheshire
and see how AEP behaves in the future.
The man told us that although the couple is not planning to leave, they
do not categorically rule out the option of selling in the future. However,
even an offer "three and a half times" as high as the one presented to them
will not send them packing. This statement suggests that the couple's initial decision to stay was not strategic. But the thought of selling, if the
224. Hammond, supra note 47.
225. Id.
226. In a recent interview, Ms. Hem suggested that she decided not to sell for "sentimental"
reasons, noting that "[m]y husband and I had this house built about 1955 and he's buried-well, I could
almost walk to his grave. And I didn't want to move. I'm too old to move to begin with, and I just
didn't like the way it was being done. I felt like I wasn't being treated right." Hem Interview, supra note
210. Ms. Hem also stated that "'I own more riverfront here than anybody and they offered me $242,700
for it .... I told their lawyers when they came down here: 'Offer me a million dollars and I'll consider
it.' But truthfully I would not even move for that. This is my home. "' Doran, supra note 209 (emphasis

added).
227.

Anonymous Interview, supra note 206.
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price is right, rests somewhere in the back of their minds. It may have been
there all along or it may have developed through time in response to the
changed circumstances around them and the actions of their neighbors. Yet
the partly ideological and partly strategic motivation makes it impossible to
classify them as either pure holdouts or pure holdins. At the end of the day,
the two categories are not mutually exclusive; rather, they are at the two
extremes of a psychological continuum.
VI
IMPLICATIONS FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING THEORY

The events in Cheshire also suggest the need to reexamine the theory
of collective action problems as applied to bargaining with groups. The
analysis so far has focused on the various acquisition strategies available to
polluters in situations involving multiple victims. Yet in Cheshire the residents initiated the buyout; the polluter stepped in at their invitation. 22 8 This
fact is at odds with the theory of collective action, as illustrated by the following example. Suppose a group of one hundred people could secure a
benefit of one hundred thousand dollars if some or all of the group would
contribute a total of twenty thousand dollars. Suppose further that the
group cannot compel any member to contribute and must rely exclusively
on goodwill. Finally, suppose that the benefit of the contributions would
flow to all members of the group regardless of their actions. In this situation, as Mancur Olson showed, self-interested individuals will choose not
to contribute to the group offer, hoping that others will bear the cost necessary to produce the benefit.229 Of course, when everyone behaves in this
fashion, the benefit will not be produced, and all group members will be
worse off.
The Cheshire buyout deal seemed to share some of the underlying
characteristics of this stylized hypothetical. Although some residents stood
to gain from selling out to AEP, each had an inherent incentive to maximize her expected payoff by not taking action and letting other interested
members bear the cost of securing an offer. A common way to overcome
the collective action problem, one that seems to have occurred in Cheshire,
is for some group members to assume the role of leaders and spearhead the
effort to coordinate the group.23 ° Indeed, certain residents, presumably
228. By "initiated," we do not necessarily mean "made an offer to sell." It is unclear who first
came up with the buyout proposal. But it is clear that residents' extensive efforts (lobbying public
officials, complaining to AEP, attracting media attention to the town's plight, and intervening in the
plant's decisions-for instance, about which abatement technologies to deploy) were instrumental in
setting the stage for the buyout.
229. MANCUR OLSON JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).
230. "The presence of a leader or entrepreneur, who articulates different ways of organizing to
improve joint outcomes, is frequently an important initial stimulus [to collective action]." Ostrom,
supra note 154, at 149.
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those who stood to gain the most from selling, led the negotiations with
AEP.23'
The emergence of entrepreneurs, or group leaders, takes care of the
collective action problem, but only at the cost of introducing an agency
problem.2 32 The fear is, of course, that the entrepreneurs will favor their
narrow self-interest over the collective interest of the group. Precisely such
allegations arose in Cheshire. 23 3 The compensation formula negotiated with
AEP was predicated on historic tax assessments, and, consequently, it apparently favored newcomers to the community (or those who had made
recent improvements to their property, and thus had it reappraised) over
long-term residents whose property had not been on the market for many
years.234 Coincidentally or not, the residents' representatives who coordinated the buyout were among the relative newcomers to the community. In
this sense, reality vindicated the theoretic prediction.
However, the Cheshire case offers a different theoretic novelty. The
cooperation between those residents who favored a sale and AEP suggests
an alternative solution to the collective action problem in bargaining settings. When coordination costs are asymmetrically distributed between the
buyer and the seller, as in the case of a single buyer and multiple sellers, it
makes sense for the buyer to shoulder the costs of coordinating the transaction. This principle may be termed the "least cost coordinator. ' '23 5 Incases
like Cheshire, this principle dictates that the polluter should always be the
one to initiate the buyout offer. After all, the cost of coordinating a buyout,
like all other transaction costs, is a deadweight loss to society, and efficiency requires that such costs be minimized.
The polluter, however, may have strategic reasons not to move first.
First among these reasons is the problem of asymmetric information. Although the polluter may be interested in buying, he may not know how
much to offer. Recall that the polluter is not just buying the affected
231.
Here we refer to Ron Hammond along with Jennifer and Steve Harrison. However, that these
residents had more at stake if the deal fell through does not explain why they volunteered to coordinate
the deal. They too could increase their personal payoffs by letting others shoulder the cost of
coordinating the buyout. In other words, their behavior is inconsistent with the theory of collective
action, at least under assumptions of strict rationality.
232. See, e.g., Abraham Pell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Anti-Property: The
Perverse Virtues of Transaction Cost and Anticommons (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
233. Anonymous Interview, supra note 206.
234.
William Fischel pointed out to us that schemes that result in higher taxes for newer residents
are called "welcome stranger" assessments in public finance, an ironic term for loading taxes on
newcomers. See, e.g., John Vitha, Comment, Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commission of
Webster County, West Virginia: The Supreme Court Gives "Welcome Stranger" Tar Assessments a
Cold Reception, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 1383 (1991). Fischel also conveyed that there may be some justice
in basing compensation on assessment, since those with the higher assessments had borne more than
their fair share of taxes in the past.
235. See generally GUtDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 135-40 (1970) (introducing and
discussing the cheapest or least cost avoider principle).
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properties, the prices of which are readily accessible, but also immunity
from future lawsuits. The residents, on the other hand, have better access to
such private information. A second reason the polluter may not move first
is to maintain its reputation. Making a buyout offer may signal culpability
on the part of the polluter or, at the very least, a fear of legal liability. The
informational disadvantage of the polluter exacerbates this concern. For if
the polluter's offer is too low and the residents reject it, the polluter's making of the offer by itself might reinforce residents' belief that they have
been wronged and prod them to sue. In short, the polluter, unlike the residents, faces a first mover disadvantage.23 6 It is interesting to note that in the
context of Cheshire, AEP insisted that a desire to be a good and cooperative neighbor rather than fear of legal liability motivated its behavior.237 A
third reason the polluter may prefer not to initiate a buyout is its hope that
the collective action problems affecting victims will prevent them from
taking legal action against it. Again, the Cheshire case is illustrative. Although Cheshire residents experienced varying degrees of pollution for
several years, to the best of our knowledge only one resident attempted to
bring legal action against AEP. That case ultimately settled.23 8
The strategic problems on both sides of a potential buyout may thwart
a mutually beneficial bargain between the polluter and the victims and lock
the parties into a stalemate. For the reasons explained, the polluter might
be reluctant to initiate an offer to buy, and residents' attempt to coordinate
an offer to sell may run aground, or not even take off, because of collective
action problems. How can this potential stalemate be avoided? One effective solution is cooperation between some of the residents and the polluter.
Specifically, residents who are eager to leave can promote their cause by
enlisting the help of the polluter. Instead of incurring the high cost of coordinating their neighbors, any resident can approach the polluter with an
offer to sell individually. Although this course of action does not bind other
members of the group, it facilitates a collective deal in two ways. First, it
provides the polluter with valuable information about the asking price of
the residents. Of course, the asking prices of different residents may vary;
yet knowing a few asking prices can help the polluter calculate her potential payout and devise a buyout plan acceptable to the residents. It is reasonable to assume that members of close-knit communities share
information among themselves about the consideration each of them
wishes to get in exchange for departure. Hence, the polluter can infer that
the amounts individual members request bear some relationship to the

236. See, e.g., Daniel J. Seidmann & Alex Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A
Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 114 HARV. L. REV. 430, 447 & n.56
(2000) (explaining a suspect's first move disadvantage in police interrogations).
237.
See, e.g., Teather, supra note 46.
238. Harrison I, supra note 1.
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amounts sought by other community members. Second, individual offers to
sell give the polluter an opportunity to portray itself as a "white knight"
who charitably comes to the aid of community residents. Seizing on the
opportunity to act "gallantly" is likely to help the polluter gain favorable
media coverage and thus enhance its reputation.
From the vantage point of residents, the separate action has an obvious downside: it reduces their bargaining power. As is clear from the employment context, collective bargaining leads to better terms, especially in
pollution cases, where the polluter is essentially a monopsony. Once a
community is hit with pollution, it loses its appeal to potential market buyers, and the only deal residents can potentially secure is to sell to the polluter. In principle, concerted action likely would have secured residents a
larger part of the bargaining surplus. However, given the problem of collective action, some members of the residents' group should be expected to
choose to deal with the polluter on an individual basis. Indeed, when coordination costs are very high, choosing to do so may be the only viable way
to coordinate buyouts.
As just shown, the Cheshire buyout presents several descriptive challenges to conventional economic analysis of the law. Cheshire also
suggests some important refinements to takings policy. These refinements
are the subject of the following Part.
VII
IMPLICATIONS FOR TAKINGS POLICY

This Article concludes by extending the normative implications of
Cheshire to the law and theory of takings. Although Cheshire is a private
takings case, it has dramatic implications for the law and policy of eminent
domain. Government exercises of eminent domain far outnumber private
takings, and accordingly their effect on private property owners and communities is much greater than that of private takings. Furthermore, while
private takers should pay above-market compensation to succeed in a buyout offer, the government must pay only fair market value. As a result,
government exercises of the eminent domain power erode private property
rights much more dramatically than do private takings. Therefore, it is imperative to discuss the lessons of Cheshire for eminent domain theory and
practice.
The power of eminent domain is probably the most discussed subject
in the whole law of property. The ample writing on the topic is due in part
to the fact that it constitutes an important intersection between property and
constitutional law, as well as to the vagueness of the Supreme Court's takings jurisprudence.23 9 The scholarly discussion of eminent domain may be
239. As examples, compare Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (finding no taking where a
state regulation required owners to cut down red cedar trees infected with a virus that could kill apple
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divided into three broad categories. The first category focuses on the
question of how one should classify takings. 24" The second addresses the
constitutional question of which government acts require compensation.24'
The third is concerned with the question of what "just compensation"
means. 24 2 The evidence of community externalities in the Cheshire buyout
offers important contributions to the first and third categories of takings
scholarship.
A.

A New Takings Taxonomy

At present, the only accepted method of classifying takings is functional, based on their effect on property. The Supreme Court has

trees) with Department of Agriculture & Consumer Services v. Mid-Florida Growers, Inc., 521 So. 2d
101 (Fla. 1988) (holding full and just compensation required when state, pursuant to its police power,
destroyed healthy trees), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 870 (1988). Additionally, compare Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (holding that elimination of mining rights is a taking) with
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass 'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (holding that elimination of
mining rights is not a taking). For academic analysis of Supreme Court jurisprudence in this area, see
BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 3 (1977) (suggesting that takings

jurisprudence is a "set of confused judicial responses"); Raymond R. Coletta, Reciprocity ofAdvantage
and Regulatory Takings: Toward a New Theory of Takings Jurisprudence,40 AM. U. L. REV. 297,
299-300 (1990) (characterizing takings jurisprudence as a "chameleon of ad hoc decisions that has bred
considerable confusion"); Gideon Kanner, Hunting the Snark, Not the Quark: Has the Supreme Court
Been Competent in Its Effort to FormulateCoherent Regulatory Takings Law?, 30 URB. LAW. 307, 308
(1998) ("The incoherence of the U.S. Supreme Court's output in this field has by now been
demonstrated time and again by practitioners and academic commentators ad nauseam, and I refuse to
add to the ongoing gratuitous slaughter of trees for the paper consumed in this frustrating and
inherently pointless enterprise."); Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying
Principles,Part I-A Critique of Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1301, 1304
(1989) ("[I]t is difficult to imagine a body of case law in greater doctrinal and conceptual disarray.");
Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV.
561 (1984).
240. See, e.g., Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 26, at 280-81 (discussing different types of
takings); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547 (2001) [hereinafter Bell
& Parchomovsky, Givings] (providing a taxonomy of givings).
241.

See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT

DOMAIN (1985) (arguing that any government action that diminishes property values should be
considered a taking for which compensation is constitutionally mandated); WILLIAM A. FISCHEL,
REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS 351-53 (1995) (arguing that compensable
takings should be found where regulations diverge from social norms); Frank 1. Michelman, Property,
Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation "Law, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 1165, 1215 (1967) (proposing that compensation for regulatory takings be paid when
demoralization costs exceed settlement costs); Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE
L.J. 36, 62-63 (1964) (requiring compensation whenever the government acts like an enterprise, such as
when it uses the property to provide goods or services, but not when it arbitrates private disputes-for
instance, by preventing noxious uses).
242. See, e.g., Abraham Bell, Not Just Compensation, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 29 (2003)
(arguing for downward adjustment of compensation awards to combat moral hazard); Hanoch Dagan,
Takings and DistributiveJustice, 85 VA. L. REV. 741 (1999) (advocating a progressive compensation
system that would award greater compensation to poor condemnees relative to affluent ones).
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recognized two prototypes of takings, physical and regulatory. 243 However,
academic commentators have observed a third prototype, derivative takings. 2" In mapping the terrain of takings, Bell and Parchomovsky explained the three prototypes as follows:
A physical taking occurs when the state seizes a property interest in
order to put it to public use. In a regulatory taking, the state does
not seize the property interest, but regulates its use in a manner that
unduly diminishes property values. A derivative taking is present
whenever a taking diminishes the value of surrounding property.
Derivative takings are a hybrid of their more familiar close cousins.
They resemble regulatory takings in that they reduce the value of
property without physically appropriating it. Yet, they are distinct
from regulatory takings in that they may arise as the result of a
physical taking. And, unlike its cousins, the derivative taking never
appears alone; it must always be preceded by a physical or a
regulatory taking.245
Although the existing typology of takings helps illuminate which
kinds of government actions may give rise to a duty to compensate, it fails
to take account of the number of properties affected by government action.
Notwithstanding scholarly acknowledgment of the ripple effects of traditional takings,246 and Bell and Parchomovsky's concept of derivative takings,247 the judicial prism remains restricted to property directly targeted by
government actions. Adjacent property that is indirectly affected and
whose owners stand to suffer considerable diminution in value fall outside
the purview of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.2 48 Use, not
value, is the sine qua non of compensation, so without government restriction on the owner's use of the property, loss of value, no matter how great,
will not give rise to compensation. Furthermore, in the case of property
owners who qualify for compensation under this restrictive test, the
Supreme Court has interpreted the constitutional requirement of just
compensation to mean payment of fair market value. 249 Although academic
243. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (recognizing the possibility that
regulation may constitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment). For a historic review of the Takings
Clause, see William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the
PoliticalProcess,95 COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1995).
244. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 26, at 280.
245. Id. at 280-81 (footnotes omitted).
246. See generally WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS: LAND VALUE CAPTURE AND COMPENSATION
(Donald G. Hagman & Dean J. Misczynski eds., 1978).
247. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 26.
248. See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (holding that only those property
owners whose houses lay directly below the air routes had a right to compensation under the Fifth
Amendment).
249. See, e.g., Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. I, 5 (1949) ("[L]oss to the owner
of nontransferable values deriving from his unique need for property or idiosyncratic attachment to it,
like loss due to an exercise of the police power, is properly treated as part of the burden of common
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commentators have proposed other compensation measures based on various criteria, 25 they too have failed to acknowledge the important implications to takings doctrine of the number of properties affected by the
government action.
The incompleteness of current theory and doctrine is likely to lead to
harsh consequences for property owners in many small places characterized by community externalities. Consider the following example. Suppose
that to pave a new interstate highway, the government must condemn 40%
of the properties in Amityville, a small, three-hundred-person community.
As is the case in many small places, Amityville is characterized by strong
interpersonal ties. Furthermore, for the local amenities to be sustained, all
current properties must remain residential. The interpersonal ties, although
strong, are not fully captured by the market value of the properties. How
will the execution of the highway plan affect Amityville? The owners of
the condemned properties will receive compensation in the amount of the
market value of their properties. In all likelihood, this measure will fall
short of the subjective value the condemnees assigned to their properties,
because it would exclude the value component property owners place on
their community. Despite this undercompensation, such residents would
nevertheless fare better than their neighbors whose properties the government chose not to take. Those left behind will find themselves in an unsustainable community, bereft of valuable personal friendships, and living
near a new interstate highway that is likely to further devalue their properties. And they will receive no compensation whatsoever.25 '
The gross undercompensation suffered by the residents of Amityville
is disconcerting on both fairness and efficiency grounds. The outcome is
unfair because it violates the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Armstrong v. United States that it is wrong to "forc[e] some people alone
to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
the public as a whole. 252 The outcome is also inefficient because it enables
the government to externalize a substantial part of the cost of its policies on
private property owners, thereby leading to inaccurate assessments of the
cost-effectiveness and desirability of government policies. In close cases,
citizenship."); United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943) (explaining that, for practical reasons,
"courts early adopted, and have retained, the concept of fair market value" in determining takings
compensation); Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934) (stating that just compensation "does
not exceed market value fairly determined").
250. See, e.g., Laura H. Burney, Just Compensation and the Condemnation of Future
Interests: Empirical Evidence of the Failure of Market Value, 1989 BYU L. REV. 789, 791
(demonstrating "the general inappropriateness of strictly adhering to any one predetermined standard
[of compensation]"); Dagan, supra note 242.
251.
Of course, government condemnations and regulations may also increase the value of
surrounding property. For a discussion of this possibility and the appropriate legal response, see Bell &
Parchomovsky, Givings, supra note 240 (developing a givings jurisprudence).
252. 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
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the undercompensation may result in inefficient exercises of the eminent
domain power.
To design a fairer and more efficient takings regime for cases involving community externalities, it is necessary to introduce a quantitative dimension to the existing conceptual framework for analyzing takings. When
community externalities exist, the main focus of the judicial inquiry should
not be so much the characterization of the government action as a physical,
regulatory, or derivative taking, but rather the effect of the action on the
relevant community.253 To accomplish this task, courts should separate the
universe of takings cases into three novel conceptual categories: isolated
takings, tippings, and clearings.
The first category, isolated takings, consists of discrete exercises of
eminent domain power. A typical example of a case in this category is the
condemnation of a single parcel to be used for a school. Instances of isolated takings are relatively rare, however. Typically, government actions in
the area of land use control involve a large number of parcels and, correspondingly, a large number of owners. As a rule, isolated takings will not
undermine community externalities, and thus should have little or no impact on the community at large. Even so, the owner of the taken property is
likely to be undercompensated by an award of fair market value because it
would not compensate him for the loss of valuable interpersonal ties." 4
The second category, tippings, is more common and thus presents a
far greater challenge.2 5' This category encompasses all cases in which the
government condemns multiple properties in a community, potentially
making unsustainable the provision of community amenities and disrupting
community life. By analogy to Schelling's model of racial segregation, the
forced exit of a sufficiently large subset of property owners can cause the
destruction of the entire community. Tippings therefore affect both those
whose property was taken and those whose legal interest in their property
was not affected. The current compensation regime adequately compensates neither group. The payment of fair market value to owners in the first
category does not compensate them for the lost value of the community.
The remaining owners, whose legal interest was not taken, will receive no
compensation at all.

253. The analysis here focuses on taking of a fee simple interest to the entire property. Of course,
the government may also exercise its power to take a lesser interest, such as a servitude, or to
appropriate a part of the property. In such cases, the effect on the community should be less drastic, and
one would expect the community to remain vital and functional. However, there should be no hard and
fast rules, and in each case courts should carefully examine the potential effect of the government
action on the community.
254. It is possible, however, that the condemnee could use the compensation award to purchase a
substitute home in the same community. This option is available to the condemnee precisely because
the community externality is not fully reflected in property prices.
255. See supra note 192.
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The third category, clearings, covers instances in which communities
are uprooted in their entirety. In these rare cases, the default rule should be
compensation in kind-that is, provision of a substitute location for resettlement. This solution would allow for preservation of community character, albeit in a different place. Of course, this measure should not be
coercive, and uninterested property owners should be able to opt out and
collect monetary damages.
The best-known case of a clearing is Poletown Neighborhood Council
v. City of Detroit.6 There, the city government exercised its eminent domain power to condemn all the properties in the Poletown neighborhood to
allow General Motors to build a new automobile-manufacturing facility.
On the whole, the city of Detroit condemned 1,400 homes, 144 businesses,
and 16 churches, many of which were turned into landscaped lawns, ponds,
and parking lots surrounding the General Motors plant.257 Jeanie Wylie's
poignant, firsthand account of the condemnation process amply demonstrates the devastating effects of the clearing on the residents of
Poletown.25 8 Wylie reported that in the aftermath of the taking, many residents were unable to resume their normal lives.2" 9 The community served
as their compass for daily life, and after its destruction they lost their sense
of direction.260
The story of Poletown is by no means an isolated one. Urban renewal
and redevelopment plans often replicate the outcome in Poletown. For example, between 1946 and 1953, the urban renewal projects executed in
New York under the supervision of Robert Moses "changed the face of
whole neighborhoods." 2 6' According to City Planning Commission estimates, these projects led to the uprooting of more than 250,000 people and
the condemnation of hundreds of apartment buildings, stores, and factories.262 Many other American cities carried out similar renewal projects

256.

304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981).

See JEANIE WYLIE, POLETOWN: COMMUNITY BETRAYED 51-52 (1989).
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. According to Wylie, several residents died shortly after they had been forced to leave
Poletown. Id. at 194-98. She also suggested that the priest of the Immaculate Conception Church that
served the Poletown community "died of a broken heart." Id. at 198. Herbert J. Gans reported that the
redevelopment of Boston's West End had a similar effect on local residents. See HERBERT J. GANS,
257.

THE URBAN VILLAGERS:

GROUP AND CLASS IN THE LIFE OF ITALIAN-AMERICANS

320 (1962) ("For

tenants, owners, and businessmen alike, the destruction of the neighborhood exacted social and
psychological losses. The clearance destroyed not only buildings, but also a functioning social system.
The scattering of family units and friends was especially harmful to the many older people.").
261.
Wendell E. Pritchett, The "Public Menace" of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private Uses
of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 37 (2003).

262.

Id. (citing

ROBERT

YORK 965-68 (1974)).

A.

CARO, THE POWER BROKER: ROBERT MOSES AND THE FALL OF NEW
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during that period.26 3 In many of those cases, property owners likely suffered severe losses for which the government did not adequately compensate them.2 6
B.

Just Compensation

To take account of the full effect of eminent domain exercises on
small communities, courts ought to do two things. First, courts ought to
broaden the focus of the compensation inquiry beyond the lots directly affected. Second, they should recognize that property owners stand to suffer
a loss well in excess of fair market value as a result of government takings,
and should compensate them at a premium. 265 At first blush, compensation
at a premium may seem like a radical idea. It is not. Compensation at a premium used to be the rule in the United Kingdom 266 and still is the rule in
263. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 34-35 (1954) (finding constitutional the urban
redevelopment plan of southwest Washington); WENDELL PRITCHETT, BROWNSVILLE, BROOKLYN 24350 (2002) (discussing how urban renewal led to the destruction of Brownsville, Brooklyn); JON C.
TEAFORD, THE ROUGH ROAD TO RENAISSANCE 154-62 (1990) (describing the effects of various urban
renewal projects on local communities); cf Brion, supra note 177, at 687-702 (1991) (discussing the
Redevelopment Act's harsh effects on individual residents in southwest Washington). For a historic
review of urban development plans in the United States, see Pritchett, supra note 261, at 31-47.
264. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1221
n.284 (1999) (observing that "[t]here was a substantial question whether the switch to factory use [in
Poletown] improved overall utility because the fair market value system of compensation misses the
subjective and community values destroyed by bundling").
Urban renewal and redevelopment present an interesting challenge for this proposal since they
sometimes (depending on their scope) fall into the category of tippings. Although by tipping
communities out such measures no doubt devastate communities and neighborhoods, in the long run
they may positively affect the property values of community members who remain. Thus, the
compensation award to residents whose property was not condemned should be adjusted to reflect this
fact. Yet the increase in property values does not happen overnight; nor is it a certain outcome. It often
takes years to complete renewal plans, and the expected increase may not materialize. The case of
Levine v. City of New Haven, 294 A.2d 644 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972), is illustrative. There, the plaintiff
brought an inverse condemnation suit after New Haven included his property in a redevelopment area
but did not take it for nine years. As a result, "plaintiff's property suffered from the normal
consequences of the planning of a redevelopment area in that the general area suffered depreciation in
value, vandalism and loss of tenants, among other deteriorating factors." Id. at 645.
265. Neither of these changes necessarily requires legislative intervention but rather a change in
the judicial approach. Nothing in the language of the Constitution dictates that takings compensation is
available only to owners of directly affected property. In fact, in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393 (1922), the first case to recognize the possibility of a regulatory taking, the Court predicated
its decision on the principle of undue diminution in value. If undue diminution in value is the
touchstone of compensation, there is no logical reason to limit its application to only certain lots.
Likewise, the Takings Clause does not mention fair market value as the right compensation measure.
The courts adopted this measure primarily for practical reasons. See United States v. 564.54 Acres of
Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979) ("Because of serious practical difficulties in assessing the worth an
individual places on particular property at a given time, we have recognized the need for a relatively
objective working rule."). Below, we show that fear of difficult assessment problems does not
necessarily apply to community value, and we suggest how compensation for loss of community may
be administered at a relatively low cost. See infra text accompanying note 276.
266. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 129, at 1115 n. 14. In the United States, Ellickson proposed
award of bonuses to compensate for subjective loss. See Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to
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Canada.26 7 In both cases the increased award was intended to soften the
negative impact of the taking, irrespective of any community effects. 68
Congress also authorized a premium in the New Hampshire Mill Act at
issue in the late-nineteenth-century case of Head v. Amoskeag
ManufacturingCo.269

Implementation of the proposed compensation regime should proceed
based on the distinction among isolated takings, tippings, and clearings.
Because isolated takings do not affect the fabric of the community, the
compensation inquiry should focus exclusively on the individual condemnee or condemnees. In this case, courts should consider compensating
the condemnee at a premium to reflect the special harm she has suffered.2 70
However, courts should not automatically award heightened compensation;
instead, they should look at the availability of substitute property in the
relevant community. When similar property is available, an award of fair
market value should suffice because the condemnee can use the compensation award to purchase a new home in the same community.
In cases of tippings, the focus of the inquiry should be expanded to
cover property owners not directly affected by the government action.
Compensation should not be limited to owners whose property was taken;
rather, it should extend to the remaining owners as well. The actual amount
paid should vary, though. Owners whose property was condemned should
be entitled to fair market value and a community premium. The remaining
owners whose property was not condemned should receive the community
premium but not fair market value. 7'
Finally, in cases of clearings, which affect all members of the relevant
community, a system of compensation in kind is appropriate. To avoid the
difficulty of accurately estimating the community premium, the government might offer all community members a substitute site where the

Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 681, 736-37
(1973).
267. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 129, at 1115 n. 14.
268. Id.
113 U.S. 9 (1885). The challenged statute required compensation-at a 50% premium over
269.
fair market value-for owners of property flooded by the damming of rivers necessary to operate mills.
270. See Brion, supra note 177, at 734 ("Incorporating the consideration of communality into the
compensation issue would require an accounting of the value that the community brought to the
expropriated owners.").
We are aware that, insofar as the loss of community is concerned, the harm suffered by the
271.
condemnees is not identical to that of the remaining community members. The latter group may have
incurred a greater or lesser loss depending on how the government is going to use the newly "acquired"
property. For instance, the construction of a highway may further reduce the property values of the
remaining owners. Yet, for simplicity's sake, we advocate a uniform compensation premium as a
default rule. In appropriate cases, courts should have the discretion to differentiate the premium paid to
various property owners, although this discretion naturally creates significant administrative burdens on
the judiciary.
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community could resettle and start afresh.272 Indeed, the government used a
similar remedy in Valmeyer, Illinois. After floods repeatedly damaged the
town, the government provided substantial funds to relocate the entire town
to higher ground a mile from its previous site.273
Of course, community members should not be forced to relocate to a
certain site-such coercion would undermine the goal of the project.
Members who prefer to continue their lives elsewhere should be allowed to
collect damages and go their separate ways. The damage award in such
cases should be fair market value plus a community premium. We summarize the proposed compensation regime in Table 3.
TABLE

3

CURRENT AND PROPOSED RULES FOR TAKINGS COMPENSATION

Type of
Taking

Current
Compensation

Fair Market Value
Isolated (FMV)

Proposed Remedy
Condemnee
Others affected
FMV plus premium to No
compensate for loss of compensation
community

Tipping FMV for condemnee;

FMV plus premium

Premium only

Resettlement of entire
community, with option of compensation

N/A (all owners
affected)

0 for all others

Clearing FMV for all owners

at FMV plus premium

The proposed compensation regime is by no means limited to small
communities in rural areas. The same principles should be extended to cohesive communities in larger urban areas. However, not every compensation scheme should necessarily incorporate a community premium. One
important factor courts should consider in determining eligibility is the

272. For discussion of compensation in kind, see Lee Anne Fennell, Hard Bargains and Real
Steals: Land Use Exactions Revisited, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2000).
273.
Sadly, although many residents did move, much of the community spirit seems to have been
lost in the process.
Some Old Valmeyer residents moved to the new subdivision, but many left the area entirely.
Younger families from elsewhere, attracted by the school, have moved in, but they shop and
play somewhere else. About 600 people live there.
In the meantime, the businesses that remained in Old Valmeyer have shut down or moved.
The community's cohesion, and any sense of a place with a history, went out with the flood.
"I hardly know anybody going down the road," said Bernice Meadors, who moved her tavern,
the Comer Pub, from the old town to the new town after the flood. "I thought the people
would come back. But those people who live up here, they don't come from here. The heart is
gone."
Kilborn, supra note 174, at A 15.
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turnover rate in the community.274 Another factor to consider is the existence of community amenities.
One might oppose this proposal on grounds of administrability. As
courts and commentators have noted, fair market value is relatively easy to
determine, and any deviation from that standard might not be cost effective. 275 Administrability concerns, although often valid, are not warranted
in this case. Adding a set compensation premium should not affect in the
least the cost of determining compensation. Insofar as administrability is
concerned, there is no difference between awarding fair market value and
120% of that amount. In appropriate cases, courts should have discretion to
adjust the community premium. But even so, administrative costs should
remain manageable as long as courts award the same premium to all affected property owners.
A related objection is that the value of the community, very much like
idiosyncratic value, is unascertainable and should therefore remain noncompensable. This objection has some merit, but it cannot carry the day.
That a loss may not be precisely ascertained does not require a nocompensation rule. In tort law, for example, the modem trend is to award
compensation for emotional harms that accompany physical injuries, despite the fact that emotional harm is idiosyncratic and unascertainable." 6
The community losses accompanying property takings seem analogous to
emotional harm in all relevant respects. Furthermore, community losses,
unlike purely idiosyncratic ones, are relatively ascertainable. Objective
indicia such as turnover rate and presence of community amenities can aid
courts in determining eligibility for a community premium. Admittedly, it
will be impossible to compensate each property owner for his precise subjective loss. But even imprecise compensation along the lines we propose
will advance both fairness and efficiency, relative to the current nocompensation regime.
CONCLUSION

That reality is complicated should hardly come as news to any
scholar. But the story of Cheshire reveals how truly complex the analysis
of real-world pollution disputes can be. It is a story of crosscutting
274. An important legal determinant affecting turnover rates in large metropolitan cities is rent
control. Indeed, Peggy Radin justified rent control schemes on the grounds that they allow strong
interpersonal ties to develop. Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849,

1878 (1987) (arguing that economic analysis should take into "account not only the monetary costs to
landlords and would-be tenants, but also the decline in well-being of tenants who are forced to lose
their homes, [and] break up their communities").
275.
See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943); DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W.
TAKINGS 175 (2002) (explaining why fair market value is the accepted
MERRILL, PROPERTY:

compensation standard).
276.
See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. REv. 1625,
1674 & n. 135 (2002) (summarizing the law with respect to emotional harm).
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motivations, unresolvable factual questions, and difficult judgments. Take
a facially simple question: Did the residents of Cheshire get a good deal
when they sold to AEP? Resolving this question is of course key to any
analysis of the economic efficiency of buyouts as a solution to pollution
disputes. At first glance, the answer appears to be a pretty clear yes, at least
for most people. After all, sellers received a multiple of their properties'
assessed valuations, which seems fairly generous. The correct answer, if
there is one, is much more nuanced, however, for several reasons.
First, it is not clear what constitutes the proper baseline against which
valuations should be measured. No viable market for properties existed in
Cheshire for at least the three years before the buyout because of the pollution problem. Hence, although residents may have preferred selling to AEP
over staying and living with pollution, it is not clear whether they would
have preferred selling to staying without pollution. That option was never
really on the table.
Second, this was not a simple land transaction: as part of the deal,
residents had to waive their rights to any future health claims against AEP.
What was being sold was a mixture of real property plus liability claims of
uncertain value. Although no evidence currently suggests that the pollution
in Cheshire has had cumulative or long-term health effects on residents, the
precise nature of these effects is still anyone's guess. Perhaps in five years
residents will come to regret signing away their future health claims. The
cognitive imperfections and psychological difficulties people face in making calculations about risks (especially regarding latent hazards) have been
well documented.2 7' Hence, it might well be inappropriate to assume that
residents of Cheshire simply made unbiased predictions of the future costs
and benefits of the deal and took the course of action with the largest expected utility. In other words, even those who express satisfaction with the
deal may be basing their approval on an optimistic undervaluation of the
health claims they signed away.
Third, some people in Cheshire were apparently reluctant sellers who
would have preferred to stay if there had been enough others who were
also willing to do so. At least some residents feared that, if they decided to
remain, they would have been left in a ghost town, with no neighbors other
than a mountainous heap of coal, and with property no one would ever buy.
As argued earlier, community externalities in Cheshire suggest a mechanism by which some residents might have been coerced into selling. One
might raise further questions about the distribution of gains from the sales;
it is possible that residents who purchased land more recently, and hence
had newer and higher tax assessments, received a better deal than others
who had held their land for a longer period.
277. For a summary and analysis of this evidence in a legal setting, see Christine Jolls et al., A
BehavioralApproach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998).

CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 92:75

Finally, there is a question of the value of the community itself. Even
before the pollution problems began, Cheshire was certainly not a
conflict-free Utopia. 278 Neither, undoubtedly, were Valmeyer, Illinois, or
the Poletown neighborhood in Detroit, or the Chicago neighborhoods of
the 1950s depicted by Ehrenhalt. 27 9 Communities can be stifling and can
breed narrow-mindedness and conformity.28 ° Moreover, they can support
the wrong kinds of values, as in the segregated communities of the Jim
Crow South.
Nevertheless, what happened in Cheshire suggests that it would be
wrong to dismiss communities as nothing more than temporary assemblies
of atomistic individuals, places with no significance other than as geographic boundaries on a map. Intangible and fragile as it may be, a sense of
community is obviously something of great importance to many residents
of small towns and urban neighborhoods. Precisely this sense of community was destroyed in the Cheshire buyout. Whether or not AEP paid
"adequate compensation," it is nevertheless critical to take account of the
importance of what has been lost.
Consider the fact that the Cheshire buyout attracted attention from
newspapers in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, and Baltimore. Fox
Television interviewed Cheshire's residents, and ABC News documented
the village's pollution problems. 281' Reporters from France, Germany, and
England visited the town. What about the buyout made it such a compelling story? We are quite convinced that the press and public did not see the
story of Cheshire as the triumph of the Coase Theorem, in which the right
to pollute was allocated to the party who valued it most (in this case, the
polluter). Instead, we attribute the public's fascination to the story's underlying message about the fragility of communities in the face of market
forces. As such, what happened in Cheshire embodied the downside of the
movement from "status to contract" that Sir Henry Maine declared to be
the hallmark of modernity.282 It is incumbent on law and economics scholars to take note of this phenomenon; one cannot begin to do so with models

278.
For example, the Craycraft family, which owned a number of lots in Cheshire, had disputes
with neighbors over rundown property and the criminal activity of some of their children. They also
allegedly received "telephone calls, things sent in the mail, threats," according to one family member.
"The N-word flew. Callers would say to get out of town or we'd be shot," allegedly because the wife of
the family's oldest son, Nick, is Black. Rita Price, A Golden Opportunity, COLUMBUS DisP., July 28,
2002, at C1. Although reprehensible, this racial animus can be interpreted as evidence of hostility to
outsiders-and an attendant sense of internal coherence-that is often attributed to small rural

communities.
279. EHRENHALT, supranote 17.
280.

See, e.g., SHERWOOD ANDERSON, WINESBURG, OHIO (1919).

281.

On the Record, supra note 167; ABC Nightly News, supra note 167.

282.
HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF
SOCIETY, AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS, 164-65 (1864) ("[T]he movement of the progressive
societies has hitherto been a movementfrom Status to Contract.").
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or theories that do not recognize the existence of communities and the vital
roles they play.2 83
APPENDIX:

ONE YEAR LATER

The Columbus Dispatch (Ohio)
284
2003 Tuesday, Home Final Edition
22,
July
Cheshire Like 'Ghost Town' for Residents Who Stayed
By Mary Beth Lane
CHESHIRE, OHIO These days, Helen Preston steers her
motorized cart through streets that don't lead to much of anywhere.
"I got this cart to visit my neighbors, and I don't have any
now," said the 89-year-old village resident. "I can go on this cart
and never talk to a person.
"It's a ghost town."
Already reduced to windowless, doorless skeletons skinned of
siding and decor, the houses that greet Preston's gaze now are
boarded and sport "no trespassing" signs.
They await demolition, as American Electric Power completes
its buyout of this Ohio River village.
The real-estate closings are virtually done, and most of the
221 occupants have moved.
On the way out-and with AEP's permission-many villagers
have picked their houses clean of siding, roofing and woodwork.
They have pulled pipes, windows and doors from their moorings
and sold them for salvage.
Preston, a widow, is among a handful of older residents who
took the buyout but were allowed to stay, rent-free, as long as they
like.
She still lives in her childhood home along Rt. 7, which is
what she wanted.
But with the once-tidy town now looking so tattered, others
who stayed behind look forward to the imminent demolitions.
This is the intermediate time.
A local AEP representative told the Village Council this
month that the company plans to raze the houses, fill and cap the
septic systems, spread topsoil and plant grass.
Economists have begun to pay attention to the importance of nonmarket forces such as
283.
communities. For a few examples of recent theoretical and empirical discussions, see Samuel Bowles &
Herbert Gintis, Social Capital and Community Governance, 112 ECON. J. 412 (2002); Edward Glaeser
etal., An Economic Approach to Social Capital, 112 ECON. J. 437 (2002); and Glaeser, supra note 170.
This literature has not yet made its way into law and economics, however.
284.

Mary Beth Lane, Cheshire Like 'Ghost Town 'for Residents Who Stayed, COLUMBUS Disp.,

July 22, 2003. Copyright © 2003 The Columbus Dispatch. Reprinted with permission of the publisher.
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"If the houses are torn down and they keep it looking nice, it
would be nicer than what we have now," said 81-year-old Gladys
Rife, who took the buyout but is remaining in her home. "I'm here
till I die."
Company officials have said they wanted the properties to
allow more space to unload coal-carrying river barges serving the
Gen. James M. Gavin electric plant.
Spokeswoman Melissa McHenry said last week, however, that
future use of the land is uncertain.
Most of the residential property has changed hands. Now AEP
plans to purchase the local Methodist church and a small
commercial building, both along Rt. 7.
As the village continues to empty, some who have started new
lives elsewhere are glad they moved.
"I love it. It's just wonderful," said Mary Phoenix, who with
her husband and eight children, has resettled on 6 acres in Bidwell,
10 miles west. But when she looks back, she also misses Cheshire:
"I miss the people. The old folks, I love them to death."
Left behind as well are neighbors outside Cheshire, who
weren't included in the buyout offer and continue to chafe at what
they say is AEP's failure to clean up emissions.
The deal that emerged in April 2002 offered villagers as much
as 3 1/2 times the worth of their properties if they signed an
agreement not to sue over any health problems claimed in
connection with smokestack emissions from the plant.
Citizens Against Pollution, a group of residents from just
outside the village limits, still meets.
"Since they bought out Cheshire, I feel like they just don't
care, and it's getting worse," said Stephanie Mulford, a member of
the group.
She said that a cloud of eye-stinging emissions, known locally
as the blue plume, swept down from the smokestacks twice
recently.
"My eyes were burning really bad. They hurt," she said.
Officials at the Gavin plant were unaware of any problems,
McHenry said.
Last week, Preston watched from the seat in her cart as
movers delicately lifted a house from its foundation and prepared
to carry it 10 miles inland. Several homeowners have sold their
dwellings to others, who are moving them.
Her face was pensive beneath her sun visor.
"You know, it seems like a dream. Sometimes I think I'll
wake up and the town would still be here."

